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MISUSE OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS: 
THE COMPETITOR PLAINTIFF 
Edward A. Snyder* 
and Thomas E. Kauper** 
INTRODUCTION 
Richard Posner, 1 Frank Easterbrook,2 and William Baumol and 
Janusz Ordover3 argue that the private antitrust remedy4 can be used 
to subvert competition. Cases filed by competitors may be particularly 
harmful, as firms may sue to prevent their rivals from realizing effi-
ciencies through mergers and other contractual arrangements, to re-
strain aggressive pricing, or merely to burden their rivals with 
litigation costs.5 Nevertheless, competitor plaintiffs historically have 
been entitled to a prominent role in private antitrust enforcement, 6 
and there are reasons to believe that they may become more active in 
the future. Recent economic literature has identified conditions 
whereby firms, either by entering into exclusionary contracts or by 
vertically integrating with suppliers, can foreclose rivals and harm 
competition. 7 The generality of some of these theories exposes a large 
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1. RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUSf LAW: AN EcONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 228 (1976). 
2. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEXAS L. REV. 1, 37 (1984). 
3. William J. Baumol & Janusz A. Ordover, Use of Antitrust to Subvert Competition, 28 J.L. 
& EcON. 247, 256-59 (1985). 
4. Clayton Act, §§ 4, 16, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26 (1988). 
5. As Judge Easterbrook states: 
Firms seek to enhance price when they can. One way to do so is to impose costs on rivals, 
for when rivals have higher costs the price on the market rises. (The price is set by the costs 
of the highest cost producer able to stay in the business.) Antitrust may be useful in raising 
rivals' costs. 
Easterbrook, supra note 2, at 33 (footnote omitted). 
6. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust's Protected Classes, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1, 21-22, 44-46 
(1989). 
7. See, e.g., Thomas Krattenmaker et al., Monopoly Power and Market Power in Antitrust 
Law, 76 GEO. L.J. 241, 254, 263-64 (1987) (arguing that courts should routinely evaluate poten-
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set of business practices to potential antitrust challenges. 8 Moreover, 
recently decided cases offer guidance to competitor plaintiffs in craft-
ing complaints against firms who engage in such practices.9 Unless 
courts are able effectively to confine suits by competitor plaintiffs to 
those that are truly meritorious, and to do so relatively early in the 
litigation process, such suits may have significant anticompetitive 
consequences. 
In this article we ask (1) under what circumstances are competitor 
suits meritorious, and (2) do existing rules, such as those requiring 
proof of market power or other so-called filters and the requirement 
that plaintiffs suffer "antitrust injury," afford a reasonable prospect of 
eliminating anticompetitive misuses of the remedy by competitor 
plaintiffs? We evaluate a sample of seventy-four cases in which plain-
tiffs sued their rivals to learn how competitor plaintiffs use the private 
antitrust remedy. And because many of these cases allege anticompe-
titive exclusionary practices, we consider how recent theories of exclu-
sionary practices may be used to support competitor claims. The 
sample, which was drawn from over 1900 private antitrust cases filed 
in five federal district courts over an eleven-year period, offers three 
advantages. First, we can avoid the biases associated with studies that 
rely exclusively on litigated cases. As is well known, these do not rep-
resent the population of claims filed and, as a result, research that re-
lies solely on published opinions cannot offer accurate insights into the 
overall character of private antitrust enforcement. 10 Second, the time 
period covered by our sample permits an inquiry into the effectiveness 
tially exclusionary practices to determine whether firms have acquired and exercised the power 
to restrict their rivals' output). 
8. For a discussion, see Scott E. Masten & Edward A. Snyder, The Design and Duration of 
Contracts: Strategic and Efficiency Considerations, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1989, at 
63, 63-64. 
9. See Monfort of Colo., Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 683 (D. Colo. 1983), ajfd., 761 
F.2d 570 (10th Cir. 1985), revd., 479 U.S. 104 (1986); Tasty Baking Co. v. Ralston Purina, Inc., 
653 F. Supp. 1250 (E.D. Pa. 1987). In Monfort, a meat packing firm sought to enjoin one of its 
larger competitors from acquiring another large meatpacking firm, arguing it would be caught in 
a "price-cost 'squeeze.'" 591 F. Supp. at 691. The Supreme Court ultimately ruled against the 
plaintiff, but soon thereafter the district court in Tasty Baking used an expansive reading of 
antitrust injury to confer standing to pursue both Sherman Act § 2 and Clayton Act § 7 claims. 
15 U.S.C. §§ 2, 18 (1982), respectively. The plaintiff argued that the defendant's merger, by 
removing an important competitor, would allow the merged firm to reap monopoly profits, 
which would be used to finance predatory pricing in other markets. The district court also found 
that the plaintiff was likely to prevail on the claims of monopolization, some of which dealt with 
improved ability to negotiate for retail shelf space. 
10. See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 1, 14-16 (1984). Priest and Klein argue that litigated cases will involve disputes 
that are concentrated around the relevant decision rule. Wittman has challenged the generality 
of this result, but the problem of selection bias in analyses of litigated cases is not in dispute. See 
Donald Wittman, Dispute Resolution, Bargaining, and the Selection of Cases for Trial: A Study of 
the Generation of Biased and Unbiased Data, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 313 (1988). 
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of the Supreme Court's 1977 decision in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo 
Bowl-0-Mat, Inc., 11 which articulated the principle that plaintiffs must 
allege that they suffered "antitrust injury"12 in preventing misuse (at 
least from the viewpoint of economic efficiency) of the remedy by com-
petitors. Third, a substantial number of the competitor cases in the 
sample involve claims of anticompetitive exclusion and so allow us to 
gauge the quality of such claims. 
In Part I we categorize the nature of the claims competitor plain-
tiffs made in our sample of cases.13 A substantial proportion involve 
claims of anticompetitive exclusion. Plaintiffs complain, for example, 
that contracts between their rivals and other parties deny them access 
to inputs or to particular customers. Our aim in Part II is to assess 
whether these competitor cases meet the necessary conditions for an-
ticompetitive exclusion to occur as indicated by the relevant theories. 
Given the information available, we find that a majority of the claims 
alleging anticompetitive exclusion do not appear to meet these condi-
tions, suggesting that many of the competitor cases are not intended to 
deter or undo harm to consumers. This analysis also indicates that 
consistent use of screens or filters derived from these theories, such as 
the need to establish market power at the outset, would help deter the 
filing of poor quality claims. 
In light of the poor quality of the claims in many of the cases re-
viewed, the obvious policy question is how to limit competitor cases to 
those that are truly meritorious.14 Indeed, our discussion is premised 
on the belief that the mere filing of poor quality claims and even the 
threat to file such claims may impose substantial costs on particular 
defendants and on competition in general. In Part III, we investigate 
whether Brunswick had a significant effect on the relative frequency of 
competitor cases and their disposition within the time frame covered 
by our sample. While the expectation might have been that the Bruns-
wick rule would limit misuse of the private remedy, we find that it had 
little effect on the frequency of competitor cases and their disposition. 
In Part IV we analyze the prospective problems the courts will face 
11. 429 U.S. 477 (1977). 
12. 429 U.S. at 489. 
13. Our focus on competitor cases alleging horizontal restraints should not imply that we 
have a favorable opinion of other private antitrust cases. Claims of price predation by customer 
plaintiffs, for example, may also be suspect because at least for the period of predation customers 
pay below-cost prices. Customers may be motivated to file suits to force dealing or to gain price 
concessions. 
14. For a discussion of the tradeolfs associated with exposing contractual arrangements that 
often enhance efficiency to antitrust scrutiny, see Oliver E. Williamson, Delimiting Antitrust, 76 
GEO. L.J. 271 (1987). 
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in evaluating competitors' allegations of anticompetitive exclusion that 
rely on the recently developed economic theories. In particular, what 
should be done with the cases where competitors offer coherent and 
potentially valid claims that a rival's practice harms their ability to 
compete? We argue that the application of the recent theories, espe-
cially those asserting that vertical integration by merger or contract 
may foreclose competitors, will be particularly difficult. The models of 
behavior upon which such claims are based offer little guidance in dis-
tinguishing strategic conduct from efficiency-motivated conduct. In 
fact, the conditions under which vertical integration might foreclose 
rivals are the same conditions that establish well-known efficiency 
motivations for integration. The burden on the courts to assess 
whether the claims meet the sufficient conditions for the practices to 
harm competition and cause antitrust injury is truly daunting, and in 
large part motivates the policy suggestions we offer in Part V concern-
ing restrictions on the use of the private antitrust remedy by competi-
tor plaintiffs. 
I. COMPETITOR CASES: ALLEGATIONS AND DISPOSITION 
What is the frequency of private claims against competitor rivals? 
When competitors initiate "horizontal" claims, what is the nature of 
their allegations? Do such claims tend to succeed? To begin to an-
swer these questions, we analyze a sample of private antitrust cases 
drawn from the Georgetown Private Antitrust Litigation Project, 15 
which collected detailed information on 1935 claims filed in five fed-
eral district courts16 during the period 1973-1983. Most of these case 
records indicate the plaintiff's business relationship to the defendant 
and other relevant information such as the product and geographic 
markets. Competitors filed about one third of the cases for which the 
plaintiff's business relationship to the defendant is known. 17 
15. The Georgetown Private Antitrust Litigation Project [hereinafter Georgetown Project] 
was initiated in 1983 by a group of antitrust lawyers. Work on the Georgetown Project 
culminated in the Georgetown Conference on Private Antitrust Litigation. A copy of the Ge-
orgetown Project is on file at the offices of the Georgetown Law Journal. See the appendix for 
further details about the sample of 74 competitor cases alleging illegal horizontal restraints. For 
additional information about the Georgetown Project, see Lawrence J. White, The Georgetown 
Study of Private Antitrust Litigation, 54 ANTITRUST L.J. 59 (1985). Conference papers appear in 
two sources: PRIVATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION: NEW EVIDENCE, NEW LEARNING (Lawrence 
J. White ed., 1988); Symposium, Private Antitrust Litigation, 74 GEO. L.J. 999 (1986). 
16. These five districts include three (the Northern District of California, the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois, and the Southern District of New York) with a high frequency of private anti-
trust cases and two (the Northern District of Georgia and the Western District of Missouri) 
where antitrust litigation is less frequent. Each is in a different circuit. 
17. Plaintiffs who are dealers account for 28% of the filings; customers filed 22% of the 
cases. 
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Competitor plaintiffs were also prominent in the subset of 311 
cases alleging "horizontal price-fixing and market allocation by hori-
zontal competitors."18 As indicated in Table 1, which groups these 
cases by plaintiff's business relationship to the defendant (competitor, 
customer, supplier, dealer, and other), competitor plaintiffs filed 
twenty-four percent of these "horizontal" claims.19 This was a sur-
prise to us, given that exercising classical market power does not harm 
rivals. Indeed, when a firm or group of firms exercises such market 
power, that is, restricts output to increase price, a competitor who 
does not join in the action benefits from both the price increase and the 
opportunity to gain additional sales. The anomaly of competitors al-
leging horizontal violations in large part motivated our inquiry into 
how competitor plaintiffs use the antitrust remedy. 
TABLE 1. PLAINTIFF'S BUSINESS RELATIONSHIP TO DEFENDANT 
IN HORIZONTAL REsTRAINT CASES 
Plaintiff's Business Relationship to Defendant 
Competitor Customer Supplier Dealer Other Total 
All Horizontal Cases 74 146 12 54 25 311 
Row% 24% 48% 4% 17% 8% 
Independently 
Initiated Cases 70 76 10 43 21 220 
Row% 32% 35% 5% 20% 10% 
Follow-on Cases 4 70 2 11 4 91 
Row% 4% 77% 2% 12% 4% 
Table 1 also distinguishes cases that followed on either Antitrust 
Division or Federal Trade Commission cases from those that were in-
dependently initiated. 20 This classification is useful in providing a pre-
liminary indication as to the nature of the competitor claims in this 
18. Georgetown Project, supra note 15 (Court Records Questionnaire 5 (June 1, 1984)). 
19. Georgetown Project, supra note 15, at 3. The questionnaire used 18 categories. We clas-
sified the cases for which business relationship data are available into five overall categories de-
fined as follows: competitor (competitor, same product; competitor, similar or substitute product; 
other competitor), customer (final customer or end user, defendant supplier to plaintiff), supplier 
(supplier), dealer (dealer, agent, distributor), and other (licensee, franchisee, employee, state or 
local government, labor union, stockholder, lessee, trade association). 
20. In a previous article, we used the indices for Antitrust Division and Federal Trade Com-
mission reporters to match defendant names and then compared information on the violations 
alleged, the statutory authorities relied upon, the time period of violations alleged, the product 
markets, the relationship of the plaintiff to the defendant, the timing of the private suit, and the 
districts in which the cases were filed. Thomas E. Kauper & Edward A. Snyder, An Inquiry into 
the Efficiency of Private Antitrust Enforcement: Follow-On and Independently Initiated Cases 
Compared, 74 GEO. L.J. 1163 (1986). We found a higher success rate for follow-on plaintiffs, 
which we attributed to the signal provided by government action and the legal and practical 
benefits the signal confers and, consistent with our findings here, to the fact that follow-on plain-
tiffs typically are customers of the defendant. Id. at 1223. 
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category. Most of the government cases that are followed by private 
plaintiffs target the exercise of classical market power.21 If lax stand-
ing rules permitted competitor plaintiffs to follow the government ac-
tions, then we would expect to see a similar proportion of competitor 
follow-on cases as is observed in independently initiated cases. But we 
find from Table 1 that nearly all of the competitor actions are initiated 
independently and that the federal enforcement actions generate pri-
marily customer suits. The distribution of plaintiff type in follow-on 
cases is significantly different from that for independently initiated 
cases.22 
In these respects the data in Table 1 suggest that classical exercises 
of market power did not generate most of the seventy-four competitor 
cases within the category of horizontal restraints. For this reason, a 
distinction made by Krattenmaker, Lande, and Salop23 between classi-
cal market power and "Bainian" market power24 is relevant. They 
state that a firm "may raise price above the competitive level . . . by 
raising its rivals' costs and thereby causing them to restrain their out-
put. " 25 As the review that follows indicates, many of the competitor 
cases in our sample involve such claims. 
A. Allegations 
To learn the nature of the seventy-four competitor cases in the cat-
egory of horizontal violations, we examined the original Georgetown 
Project data files (responses to questionnaire, excerpts from com-
plaints, descriptions of motions, and notes by paralegal research assist-
ants), that identify the plaintiff and defendant(s), the filing date, and 
the jurisdiction, and also provide information about the specific viola-
tions alleged and the outcome of the case.26 We also identified pub-
21. Id. 
22. Within the group of cases alleging horizontal violations, the distribution of competitor 
cases into the follow-on and independently initiated subsets is statistically different from the 
analogous distribution for the other cases. (The Chi-Square statistic is 24.4, with one degree of 
freedom, and is significant at the one percent level. The Chi-Square statistic summarizes the 
standard test for the independence of cells in contingency tables where observations are divided 
according to various attributes. Higher values of the statistic indicate deviations from indepen· 
dence.) Observing this difference is reassuring insofar as potential errors in the data are con-
cerned. A large number of researchers using actual court records collected the Georgetown data. 
Errors are unavoidable in this sort of effort. However, if data errors were severe, differences of 
the type indicated by Table 1 would not be found. 
23. Krattenmaker et al., supra note 7, at 249. 
24. The term "Bainian" market power is derived from the pioneering industrial organization 
research of Professor Joe Bain. His work analyzed barriers to entry, including the possibility 
that small firms would be at a cost disadvantage relative to large firms. See JOE S. BAIN, BARRI· 
ERS TO NEW COMPETITION (1956). 
25. Krattenmaker et al., supra note 7, at 249. 
26. The Georgetown University Law Library retained the original files for the full sample of 
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lished opinions - not necessarily final opinions - for twenty-four 
cases. Many of these offer further information about the nature and 
likely merit of the allegations. Finally, the Antitrusl & Trade Regula-
tion Reporter provided summaries of various aspects of twenty-five 
cases. 
Table 2 summarizes, as best as we can determine, the primary alle-
gations. 27 Only four cases appear to relate to classical horizontal 
price-fixing agreements, with the plaintiffs objecting to agreements 
among other competitors that at least in theory could both facilitate 
the exercise of market power and harm the plaintiff - for example, 
boycotts or concerted efforts to deny entry.28 Thirty-seven cases allege 
various exclusionary practices by a single competitor with the focus on 
contractual agreements between the competitor defendant and either 
its customers, suppliers, or distributors. 29 Competitor plaintiffs appear 
to characterize such practices as illegal horizontal restraints of trade 
under section 1 of the Sherman Act. 30 Given that sue~ practices may 
reduce competition, these claims may be viewed as alleging a horizon-
tal effect, but they are clearly different from classical horizontal re-
straints. Often the plaintiffs seek relief in the form of "requirement of 
dealing or purchases" or "cease and desist from joint action" rulings.31 
1935 private antitrust cases. The authors requested copies of the files for the subset of competitor 
cases alleging "horizontal" violations. 
27. The appendix lists the full set of cases using the same categories. The names of the 
parties, the filing date, and jurisdiction for these cases were obtained from the June l, 1984 Court 
Records Questionnaire (page 1) used by the Georgetown Antitrust Project. 
28. In theory, denying competitors membership in a trade association and conducting boy-
cotts could police a horizontal agreement and injure a competitor. See Vogel v. American Socy. 
of Appraisers, 744 F.2d 598, 600 (7th Cir. 1984). 
29. These plaintiffs typically do not name more than one defendant within a given line of 
business, but often charge both a manufacturer and either a customer, supplier, or dealer with 
whom the manufacturer has a business relationship. We should riote that nine of the 74 competi-
tor plaintiffs were also either dealers or customers, and so in theory could be directly injured by a 
classical price-fixing violation, but the fact that the plaintiff's primary relationship is that of a 
competitor suggests otherwise. Another indicator is that seven of these nine price-fixing cases are 
among a larger subset of 44 cases in which the plaintiffs also allege tying, vertical price-fixing, 
vertical price-discrimination, or refusals to deal .as secondary offenses. 
30. 15 u.s.c. § 1 (1988). 
31. The Georgetown Project's Court Records Questionnaire requesting information on the 
type of relief sought generated these responses. 
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TABLE 2. CLASSIFICATION OF COMPETITOR CASES ALLEGING 
ILLEGAL HORIZONTAL REsTRAINTS OF TRADE 
Nature of Allegations: 
Anti-Competitive Exclusion 
Access to inputs 
Access to retail outlets or distribution networks 
Exclusive contracts with buyers 
Price Predation 
Classical Horizontal Agreement 
Vertical Price Fixing, Vertical Price Discrimination 
Brandname/Patent Infringement 
No Sherman Act Issue 













Table 2 also provides a more detailed breakdown of the thirty-
seven cases involving exclusionary practices. In four cases, the plain-
tiffs complained of a lack of access to input markets. In ten others, the 
plaintiffs claimed they were denied access to distribution outlets. The 
third subcategory includes a variety of disputes concerning exclusion-
ary features of relationships between buyers and sellers, but plaintiffs 
do not appear to argue they lack access to either an input market as a 
whole or to a large number of distribution outlets. Several of the cases 
in this group involve transportation services. Finally, ten cases involve 
allegations of below-cost pricing aimed at deterring entry or driving a 
rival out of the market. 32 
The balance of cases involve a wide range of practices. For the 
nine cases in the "No Sherman Act Issue" category, plaintiffs make 
claims clearly outside of the realm of the Sherman Act.33 An addi-
tional seven cases are fundamentally brandname or patent infringe-
ment cases. For eight other cases in the "Miscellaneous/Insufficient 
Information" category, the claims cannot be usefully categorized or 
we have insufficient information about the case to identify and evalu-
ate the claim. 34 
32. See, e.g., Hoyt Heater Co. v. American Appliance Mfg. Co., 502 F. Supp. 1383 (N.D. 
Cal. 1980). 
33. Claims in those cases include deception, false and misleading advertising, waste of corpo-
rate assets, and securities violations. 
34. For example, it is difficult to classify American Basketball Assn. v. National Basketball 
Assn., No. 75-6184 (S.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 9, 1975) (concerning NBA's draft of ABA's players), i11 
Georgetown Project, supra note 15. 
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B. Disposition 
In Table 3 we compare disposition data for the horizontal restraint 
cases filed by competitors to horizontal restraint cases filed by other 
plaintiffs. Of the seventy-four cases filed by competitors, we have 
meaningful outcome data on sixty-seven cases. Of the 237 cases filed 
by other types of plaintiffs, we have meaningful outcome data for 183 
cases. The table reports case totals in four categories of outcomes: 
dismissed, pretrial stipulation, settled, litigated.35 Unfortunately, 
there is a substantial degree of uncertainty concerning cases identified 
as ending in pretrial stipulations, a category available on the original 
Georgetown Project form. In our best judgment, these probably do 
not involve payments to plaintiffs in most cases, and when payments 
are made the dollar amounts likely are small. Likewise, if the stipula-
tion includes some relief to plaintiff, it is usually not substantial. In 
this sense, pretrial stipulations are probably more similar to dismissals, 
where plaintiffs are granted no relief, than to settlements. 36 Also of 
note, we include in the "Litigated" category cases ended by the grant-
ing of a defendant's motion for summary judgment and by directed 
verdicts, which is consistent with the view that these outcomes reflect 
a determination on the merits. 37 Of the cases in the "Litigated" cate-
gory, more than seventy percent resulted in judgments for 
defendants. 38 
35. A fifth general category, other outcomes, includes cases without meaningful disposition 
- such as cases remanded to state courts or whose file is missing - and so Table 3 excludes 
these cases. The Georgetown Project used 17 mutually exclusive subcategories. Our classifica-
tion scheme groups the 17 subcategories as follows: dismissed (dismissed on pretrial motion, 
pretrial withdrawal, dismissal by court, dismissal by other means), pretrial stipulation (pretrial 
stipulation and order), settled (settled), litigated (judgment for all plaintiffs, judgment for some 
plaintiffs, judgment for all defendants, judgment for some defendants, judgment for some plain-
tiffs and some defendants), and other (statistically closed, consolidated, file missing, transferred 
or remanded to state court, outcome unknown, pending). 
36. Consistent with this distinction between settlements and pretrial stipulations, of cases in 
the overall sample we found the following: 44% of those resulting in pretrial stipulations ended 
within one year of filing, compared with 23% of settled cases. We considered categorizing pre-
trial stipulations as dismissals. However, a cross-check of cases ending in pretrial stipulations 
and data on whether cases ended with or without prejudice indicated that some pretrial stipula-
tions are settlements, albeit of lower average value to the plaintiff. Therefore, we retain the 
separate category even though the typical stipulation is similar to a dismissal. 
37. Stephen Calkins found a greater willingness of the courts in recent years to grant defend-
ant motions to dismiss and for summary judgment, although the number of motions granted is 
still low. Calkins did not find significant differences between the frequency of summary judg-
ments in competitor cases versus cases filed by other plaintiffs for the full population of cases. He 
did not, however, investigate whether competitor claims differ in this regard within categories of 
claims, e.g., cases alleging horizontal restraints. Stephen Calkins, Summary Judgment, Motions 
to Dismiss, and Other Examples of Equilibrating Tendencies in the Antitrust System, 74 GEO. L.J. 
1065 (1986). 
38. The proportion of plaintiff successes was independent of the factors we checked, such as 
violation alleged, plaintiff's business relationship to the defendant, whether the case followed a 
government case, and the outcome of the government case. Thus, the litigated cases in the Ge-
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TABLE 3. OUTCOMES OF CASES ALLEGING ILLEGAL HORIZONTAL 
RESTRAINTS 
Method of Disposition 
Pre-Trial 
Dismissal Stipulation Settlement Litigation Total 
Competitor 
Plaintiffs 25 18 6 18 
Row% 37% 27% 9% 27% 
Other 
Plaintiffs 39 74 43 27 
Row% 21% 40% 24% 15% 
Note: 




As indicated in Table 3, the proportion of cases that were litigated 
or dismissed is higher for competitor filings than for other filings. One 
problem in comparing the two distributions is that the additional in-
formation we collected regarding the competitor cases allowed us to 
reclassify some of the case outcomes, including eight cases in the "Pre-
trial Stipulation" category.39 For the cases filed by other types of 
plaintiffs, however, we have only the original classification from the 
Georgetown Project. But even without the additional information, the 
difference in the distribution of cases by method of disposition for the 
two plaintiff groups - competitor plaintiffs and other plaintiffs - is 
statistically significant, with more of the competitor cases being dis-
missed and fewer ending in settlements.40 Moreover, ten of the com-
petitor cases in the "Litigated" category were ended by grants of 
defendant motions for summary judgment. Thus, the disposition data 
appear to indicate that the courts discriminate against competitor suits 
alleging horizontal restraints. If the claims lack merit, this treatment 
reduces the efficiency losses from the competitor claims as well as the 
costs they impose on defendants.4 1 
orgetown sample are consistent with Priest and Klein, whose model predicts that the plaintiff's 
probability of success in cases selected for litigation will be within a small range, and that this 
range will not vary with factors such as the particular legal standard employed. Priest & Klein, 
supra note 10, at 19. 
39. Of the 74 competitor cases, we found that 19 case outcomes should be reclassified. Two 
cases that were pending were reclassified as litigated. Within the pretrial stipulation category, we 
found that six cases were in fact dismissed and two were litigated. Finally, of those originally 
identified as dismissals, we found eight litigated cases and one settlement. 
40. Based on the data in Table 3, the Chi-Square statistic is 16.7 with three degrees of free-
dom and is significant at the one percent level. Using the unadjusted Georgetown Project data, 
the Chi-Square statistic is 15.5 with three degrees of freedom and is also significant at the one 
percent level. 
41. Similar findings for competitor cases attempting to block mergers would not be as mean-
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II. AsSESSING THE PROBLEM OF MISUSE OF THE ANTITRUST 
LAWS 
Since many of the seventy-four cases filed by competitors involve 
claims of anticompetitive exclusion, we begin this Part by reviewing 
some of the relevant economic theories and identifying the necessary 
conditions under which exclusion of efficient rivals may occur. We 
then assess the potential merit of the competitor claims in our sample. 
This review in some respects follows that of Judge Frank Easterbrook, 
who argues that filters can be used to identify antitrust claims that 
lack merit. 42 
A. Theories of Anticompetitive Exclusion 
Traditionally, economic analysis of exclusion has focused on pred-
atory pricing, selling tactics such as tying, and vertical restraints such 
as exclusive dealing. At least in the case of price predation, a consen-
sus concerning when such tactics may succeed has emerged. It is un-
derstood that some sort of reentry barriers, possibly including the fear 
of a predatory response, must exist for the strategy to work. Other-
wise, the predator cannot earn above normal profits sufficient to 
recoup lost profits sustained during the predation, after rivals are elim-
inated. 43 Other conditions that increase the likelihood of successful 
predation are cost advantages and low marginal costs of expanding 
output. A high market share is also necessary since without it the 
costs of expanding output to drive out rivals is high and the potential 
profits afterward are small. 44 
Recently a quite extensive literature most closely associated with 
Steven Salop has evaluated nonpredatory practices that may permit 
firms to exclude otherwise efficient rivals.45 This literature, often re-
ingful because anything except an immediate dismissal of a merger case may jeopardize the 
acquisition. 
42. Easterbrook's criteria include the plaintiff's business relationship to the defendant and 
the defendant's market power. See Easterbrook, supra note 2, at 16-17, 36. We note that we do 
not embrace the proposition that all competitor claims that meet the necessary conditions should 
be allowed to proceed. See Part IV for a discussion. 
43. See Wesley J. Leibeler, Whither Predatory Pricing? From Areeda and Turner to Matsu-
shita, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1052 (1986). 
44. The view that price predation is not a profitable tactic in most circumstances has been 
qualified when the objective of the predator is to acquire the rival. See Malcolm R. Burns, Preda-
tory Pricing and the Acquisition Cost of Competitors, 94 J. POL. EcoN. 266, 270-71, 275-78 (1986); 
Garth Saloner, Predation, Mergers, and Incomplete Information, 18 RAND J. EcoN. 165, 176-79 
(1987). 
45. Contributors include Oliver Hart & Jean Tirole, Integration and Market Foreclosure, in 
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON EcONOMIC ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS 1990, at 205 (1990); Michael 
A. Salinger, Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure, 103 Q.J. EcoN. 345 (1988); IAN AYRES, 
VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND OVERBUYING: AN ANALYSIS OF FORECLOSURE VIA RAISING 
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ferred to as "raising rivals' costs" theories, broadens considerably the 
scope of practices that may be thought to deter entry or limit a rival's 
effectiveness. The models indicate that vertical integration via merger 
or contractual arrangements may have anticompetitive effects by alter-
ing buying patterns. In contrast to the more settled views on preda-
tion, "the debate about the conditions under which vertical mergers 
are anticompetitive," in the words of Oliver Hart and Jean Tirole, "is 
far from settled. "46 
Nevertheless, the premise underlying the raising rivals' costs litera-
ture is straightforward. The demand curve facing a firm can be 
thought of as the difference between the market demand and the com-
bined supply of its rivals. Firms gain an advantage when their rivals 
experience a cost increase. The greater costs may lead rivals to exit or, 
prospectively, may prevent entry. When the effect is less dramatic -
rivals remain but have higher marginal costs - the firm's demand still 
improves: at a given market price its rivals supply a smaller quantity, 
leaving a larger residual for the firm. Alternatively, holding constant 
the quantity supplied by the firm, the price it receives will rise when its 
rivals experience a cost increase. 
According to developers of the theories, anticompetitive exclusion 
may occur in a variety of market contexts. Krattenmaker and Salop 
argue that manufacturers may acquire exclusive rights to inputs and 
thereby raise their rivals' costs of procuring inputs.47 In one scenario, 
with an oligopoly input market, Salinger models the case where fol-
lowing vertical integration between some input suppliers and down-
stream firms, the remaining independent suppliers raise input prices to 
the unintegrated downstream firms.48 By eliminating some supply 
from input market, the vertical mergers in effect move the oligopoly 
equilibrium closer to that of a pure monopoly. In a second scenario 
modeled by Ayres, 49 input supply is competitive but is less than per-
fectly elastic, i.e., there is an upward sloping input supply curve. By 
vertically integrating, a downstream manufacturer may both use in-
puts produced internally and purchase inputs from nonintegrated in-
put suppliers. Ayres shows that if a manufacturer acquires rights to a 
RIVAIS' COSTS (American Bar Foundation Working Paper No. 8803, 1988); Janusz A. Ordover 
et al., Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure, 80 AM. EcoN. REV. 127 (1990); and Michael D. Whin· 
ston, Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion, 80 AM. EcoN. REV. 837 (1990). 
46. See Hart & Tirole, supra note 45, at 205. 
47. Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anti-Competitive Exclusion: Raising Ri· 
vals' Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986). 
48. See Salinger, supra note 45. 
49. AYRES, supra note 45, illustrates the foreclosure effect in the case where one of two 
manufacturers acquires half of the input industry's capacity. 
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large share of the available inputs, then input prices to other manufac-
turers will rise, which in turn limits their ability to compete. 
Other recent theories of anticompetitive exclusion focus on the po-
tentially anticompetitive role of certain types of contracts. Some of 
these are thematically related to the raising rivals' cost scenarios since 
the exclusionary contracts may affect the ability of rivals to achieve 
economies of scale. 50 Others focus on how specific contractual provi-
sions limit the ability of rivals to compete for buyers. According to a 
prominent theory developed by Aghion and Bolton, 51 contracts with 
liquidated damage clauses might exclude efficient rivals. They posit 
that an incumbent seller and buyer who anticipate possible entry will 
agree to a contract with excessively high level of liquidated damages 
- that is, greater than the lost profits for the incumbent seller - to be 
paid to the incumbent if the buyer switches suppliers. 52 By assump-
tion, the incumbent and the buyer are in a monopoly position, but 
cannot set a discriminatory entrance fee for the potential entrant, 
whose costs are unknown to them. The transactors' choice of liqui-
dated damages, as a result, balances the gains from a higher entrance 
fee with the losses associated with the likelihood that potential rivals 
will not enter. The exclusion of a more efficient supplier occurs when 
an entrant's cost advantage over the incumbent is too small to pay the 
liquidated damages. 
B. Necessary Conditions for Anticompetitive Exclusion 
The recent economic literature demonstrates that firms may use 
exclusionary practices to their advantage. But the economic analyses 
are only useful in guiding antitrust policy if their insights into how to 
strengthen competition translate into legal rules that can be applied 
systematically by the courts. In principle, the first step toward appli-
cation is to identify the necessary conditions under which the practices 
may exclude a rival or conversely, to identify when the practices in 
question will not cause anticompetitive exclusion. 53 
This first step is not easy. The sets of necessary conditions for the 
50. See the second model in Philippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, Contracts as a Barrier to 
Entry, 77 AM. EcoN. REV. 388 (1987), and the analysis in § 5 of ERIC RAsMUSEN, RECENT 
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EcONOMIES OF EXCLUSIONARY CONTRACTS (UCLA Working Paper 
No. 89-15, 1989), in THE CENTENARY OF COMPETITION LAW IN CANADA (R.S. Khemani & 
W.T. Stanbury eds., forthcoming 1992). 
51. See the first model in Aghion & Bolton, supra note 50. 
52. Alternatively, the contract may specify an excessive up front payment to the seller and a 
relatively low per unit charge for each unit sold. Hence, the argument can be extended to two-
part pricing. 
53. We discuss the questions concerning sufficient conditions in Part IV. 
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various exclusionary tactics are in fact both complex and varied. 
Moreover, the theories indicating exclusionary effects rely on require-
ments that are particularly difficult to assess, e.g., asymmetries in the 
values of purchase rights, scale economies, and the credibility of con-
ditional contracts. These considerations would appear to make appli-
cation of these theories an exacting task. Yet both reviewers of the 
raising rivals' costs literature and some of its contributors have come 
to a particularly useful conclusion: Firms that exclude otherwise effi-
cient rivals either must exercise classical market power in the input or 
product market, or help orchestrate such an effect. 54 
If this conclusion is correct, then anticompetitive exclusion (where 
otherwise efficient rivals are impaired) typically requires that two mar-
ket conditions exist. First, the market must exhibit a high enough de-
gree of market concentration to permit firms to orchestrate and 
exercise market power. Second, barriers to entry must limit the ability 
of potential entrants and fringe competitors to increase substantially 
their output in response to that action. Moreover, the "core" condi-
tions - the ones that constitute the substance of most standard anti-
trust analysis - can be used to evaluate the validity of exclusionary 
claims. Brennan55 was the first, or among the first, to sound this 
theme. He argues that the tactics of raising rivals' costs should be 
viewed as facilitating devices for the exercise of classical market power. 
For example, in the input oligopoly scenario discussed above, 
nonintegrated suppliers could not charge the unintegrated rival manu-
facturers higher prices absent barriers to entry. In this light, a vertical 
merger that establishes exclusive rights to a portion of the input sup-
ply is the critical enhancement of the ability of remaining input suppli-
ers to exercise latent market power. 56 Rasmusen, when describing the 
closely related and aptly named "Cartel Ringmaster" model, states the 
proposition clearly: "The intermediary [manufacturer] then restricts 
output to the ultimate consumers. The point is not especially to ex-
clude rival intermediaries, but to cartelize the suppliers."57 Coate and 
Kleit emphasize a related proposition, that firms who stand to benefit 
from raising rivals' cost strategies must themselves be protected from 
54. As we discuss next, examples include RAsMUSEN, supra note 50, at 9-10, and Timothy J, 
Brennan, Understanding "Raising Rivals' Costs," 33 ANTITRUsr BULL. 95, 99 (1988). 
55. Brennan, supra note 54, at 99 (1988). 
56. One feature of the adverse effects of exclusive rights contracts in common with several 
examples suggested by Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 47, is regulation of the input market, 
e.g., telephone service or electricity. Such regulation might explain why a downstream party 
could facilitate the exercise of market power while the supplier could not or would not do so. 
57. RASMUSEN, supra note 50, at 11-12. Rasmusen also points out that the vertical integra-
tion would not occur if input suppliers could collude. 
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new entry by, for example, cost advantages.58 
Krattenmaker, Lande, and Salop argue against using the core of 
standard antitrust analysis to evaluate exclusionary claims. 59 But it is 
revealing that the formal models of foreclosure invariably assume oli-
gopoly conditions, and then proceed to analyze the effects of mergers 
or exclusionary contracts between firms with large market shares in at 
least the input or product markets. 60 Indeed, most formal models are 
set in a duopoly context and, in the game theoretic formulations that 
are used to develop these theories, the possibility of entry is not 
considered. 
The question may arise, why are these models constructed in such 
a restrictive manner? It should be understood that their purpose is to 
demonstrate rigorously that various claims of anticompetitive exclu-
sion may be valid. To obtain results and at the same time avoid multi-
ple equilibria, the models can only entertain simple market structures 
such as duopoly and analyze determinate firm behavior. In principle, 
the models could be adapted to allow for alternative market struc-
tures, the possibility of entry, and a richer variety of firm behavior. 
Introducing such features would, however, yield a broader set of out-
comes and so detract from their exemplifying purpose. 61 We accept 
the validity of the models, but recognize that care must be exercised in 
deriving policy implications from them. In this regard, it is revealing 
that no models, to our knowledge, have demonstrated how vertical 
integration can harm unintegrated rivals when the integrated firm or 
firms do not control a substantial market share. 
The need for classical market power is present, for example, in 
Hart and Tirole's "ex post monopolization" scenario whereby vertical 
integration leads to monopolization of the downstream market. 62 A 
relatively efficient input supplier integrates to regulate input 
58. MALCOLM B. COATE & ANDREW N. KLEIT, EXCLUSION, COLLUSION AND CoNFUSION: 
THE LIMITS OF RAISING RIVALS' Cosrs (Federal Trade Commission Working Paper, Oct. 
1990). 
59. Krattenmaker et al., supra note 7, at 254-56. 
60. See the works cited in supra note 45. 
61. Franklin Fisher uses the term "exemplifying theory" to characterize such models and 
distinguish them from "generalizing theory." He states: 
Exemplifying theory does not tell us what must happen. Rather it tells us what can happen. 
In a good exemplifying-theory paper, the model is stripped bare, with specializing assump-
tions made so that one can concentrate on the phenomena at issue .... When well handled, 
exemplifying theory can be very illuminating indeed, suggestively revealing the possibility of 
certain phenomena. What such theory lacks, of course, is generality. The very stripping-
down of the model that makes it easy (or even possible) to see what is going on also prevents 
us from knowing how the results will stand up in more general settings. · 
Franklin M. Fisher, Games Economists Play: A Noncooperative View, 20 RAND J. EcoN. 113, 
117-18 (1989). 
62. See Hart & Tirole, supra note 45, at 220-32, 
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purchases. The underlying premise is that absent the vertical integra-
tion, the downstream firms could not exercise their market power, that 
is, could not restrict their output. In the model, vertical integration 
and the regulation of input purchases is the best (least costly) means of 
achieving a collusive outcome. Such an outcome is possible only when 
market conditions including seller concentration and entry barriers 
would allow for the exercise of market power.63 
The utility of the well-worn tools of antitrust analysis such as 
measures of market concentration and barriers to entry also extends, 
in our view, to claims that contractual relationships may cause an-
ticompetitive exclusion. As indicated in Aghion and Bolton's scena-
rio, the incumbent seller and buyer are in a monopoly position when 
they enter into the contract with excessively high liquidated dam-
ages. 64 Their results also rest on other assumptions that are related to 
standard analysis: potential entrants must be few in number yet also 
potentially more efficient than the incumbent. Otherwise an entrant 
would not expect the above-normal profits that motivate the use of 
excessive liquidated damages. 6s 
As indicated above, some further necessary conditions must be met 
for particular practices to exclude otherwise efficient rivals. Screening 
cases using only the core necessary conditions, therefore, will only 
identify some of the cases that lack merit. For example, it may be the 
case that a vertically integrated firm has a large enough market share 
so that a claim of exclusion is potentially valid. But whether further 
conditions are met, such as firms placing different values on exclusive 
rights contracts, may not be known. 66 Similarly, incumbent firms em-
ploying contracts with liquidated damages may be viewed as attempt-
ing to exclude rivals, but whether the damages constitute a penalty 
and whether such contracts could sustain a legal challenge would be 
difficult to discern. 61 
With this caveat in mind, we return to our sample of competitor 
63. RAsMUSEN, supra note 50, at 21, observes that the U.S. Justice Department's 1985 
Guidelines on Vertical Restraints (50 Fed. Reg. 6263) are also consistent with this proposition. 
Practices such as exclusive dealing may exclude an otherwise efficient rival, but only when"(!) 
[t]he 'nonforeclosed' market is concentrated and leading firms in the market use the restraint; (2) 
[t]he firms subject to the restraint control a large share of the 'foreclosed market'; and (3) [e]ntry 
into the foreclosed market is difficult." 
64. Aghion & Bolton, supra note 50. 
65. For a more detailed discussion, see Masten & Snyder, supra note 8, at 69-73. 
66. See RASMUSEN, supra note 50 (evaluating the potential for vertical integration and exclu-
sive rights contracts to cause anticompetitive exclusion). 
67. Of note, liquidated damages may yield efficiency benefits by protecting parties who make 
transaction-specific investments. Aghion & Bolton, supra note 50, at 390-91, ignore such consid-
erations by assuming that there is no time interval between production and trade and hence no 
potential for hold-up problems. 
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claims and attempt to assess their potential merit. We focus primarily 
on the claims alleging anticompetitive exclusion. These may involve 
access to inputs or distribution outlets, cite exclusionary features of 
contracts, or allege classical price predation. Our primary objective is 
to determine whether these claims meet the "core" necessary condi-
tions described above. We also review other types of claims and offer 
comments on their likely merit. 
C. Detailed Review of Competitor Cases 
1. Claims Alleging Anticompetitive Exclusion 
Claims involving access to inputs. One of the four cases that in-
volve access to inputs, Julius Nasso Concrete Corp. v. DIC Concrete 
Corp., 68 matches one of the Krattenmaker and Salop scenarios quite 
well and, moreover, appears to meet the necessary core conditions for 
exclusionary tactics to succeed. Plaintiff Nasso and defendant DIC 
competed for concrete work on New York City construction projects. 
Prior to 1973, two suppliers, Certified Industries and Transit Mix, ac-
counted for most of the ready-mix concrete and other building sup-
plies sold to area subcontractors. Nasso complained that a 1973 joint 
venture agreement between its rival, DIC, and one of the input suppli-
ers, Certified, resulted in higher input prices to Nasso and thereby ex-
cluded Nasso from competing effectively for large construction 
subcontracts. 69 
While one might argue that entry into a local input market would 
be relatively easy, the Justice Department has filed a disproportion-
ately large number (relative to the industry's size) of Sherman Act 
section 170 cases against cement and concrete suppliers, 71 which sug-
gests that these firms attempt to exercise market power with some fre-
quency. Moreover, antitrust authorities have had longstanding 
concerns about the exclusionary effects of vertical mergers in the ce-
ment industry.72 The joint venture between DIC and Certified may 
have (1) facilitated a price-fixing agreement, or (2) led Transit Mix, 
independent of an agreement, to raise prices to Nasso. Nasso argued 
the latter.73 
68. 467 F. Supp. 1016 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). 
69. 467 F. Supp. at 1021. Nasso bought exclusively from the other input supplier, Transit 
Mix. 467 F. Supp. at 1021. 
70. 15 u.s.c. § 1 (1988). 
71. See Jon Joyce, Effect of Firm Organizational Structures on the Incentives to Engage in 
Price Fixing, CONTEMP. POLY. ISSUES, Oct. 1989, at 19, 25-27. 
72. See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, EcoNOMIC REPORT ON MERGERS AND VERTICAL 
INTEGRATION IN THE CEMENT INDUSTRY (1966). 
73. It appears that the plaintiff, who bought exclusively from the nonintegrated supplier, 
568 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 90:SS1 
In two of the other cases, 74 there are no indications of barriers to 
entry into the input markets (film processing equipment and zipper 
slides), nor that the supply contracts in question accounted for a sub-
stantial share of inputs supplied. Hence, it is unlikely that the defend-
ants in these cases were engaged in anticompetitive conduct. We do 
not have sufficient information to evaluate the plaintiff's claims in the 
remaining case involving access to computer disk drive filters. 75 
Claims involving access to retail outlets. In the ten cases in which 
competitor plaintiffs complain of contracts with retailers, the inquiry 
regarding necessary conditions focuses on barriers to entry into the 
retail market. Absent barriers, exclusive dealing contracts could not 
inhibit an effective competitor. If barriers do exist and exclusive con-
tracts are in place, then the remaining retailers in principle may charge 
higher prices for their services to rival manufacturers. Presumably 
this coordination requires a relatively small number of unconstrained 
retail outlets and a lack of alternative means for the manufacturer to 
distribute the product. 
In Budget Rent-A-Car Corp. v. Hertz Corp., 16 which relates to Fed-
eral Trade Commission enforcement actions against the major car 
rental companies, the plaintiff complained that established car rental 
companies bribed airport officers to control access to the within-air-
port floor space devoted to the companies' retail operations. 77 Due to 
government control, floor space for car rental companies at airports is 
restricted. In principle, then, overbuying could raise rivals' costs. 
Plaintiff did not prevail, however, as defendants' efforts to influence 
the allocation of the airport floor space were judged to be protected by 
the Noerr-Pennington doctrine,78 which shields from the antitrust 
erred in characterizing these as Robinson-Patman (IS U.S.C. § 13) claims rather than Sherman 
Act § 2 (IS U.S.C. § 2) claims. See Private Plaintiff May Seek Divestiture under Clayton § 7. 
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 908, at A-19, A-21 (Apr. S, 1979). 
74. Consolidated Intl. Corp. v. Prefexray Div., Litton Medical Prods., Inc., No. 73-1499 
(N.D. Ill. filed June 12, 1973), and E<llon Indus., Inc. v. Slide-Rite Mfg. Corp., No. 76-0249 
(S.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 4, 1976), in Georgetown Project, supra note IS. 
7S. International Filter Corp. v. Cambridge Filter Corp., No. 82-4918 (N.D. Cal. filed Sept. 
14, 1982), in Georgetown Project, supra note IS. 
76. No. 77-0876 (N.D. Cal. filed Feb. 29, 1977), in Georgetown Project, supra note 15. 
77. Note that the exercise of classical market power by a cartel may or may not involve 
efforts to exclude competitors, but when it occurs it is distinguishable from the exercise of 
Bainian market power. The difference lies in whether or not there is an agreement among hori-
zontal competitors to restrict output and raise price. Here, because floor space devoted to car 
rental companies at airports is limited, competitors may exercise Bainian market power by ac-
quiring or leasing an excessive amount of space, with the result that some or all competitors are 
excluded. Such action may also be taken to maintain an agreement among the incumbent rivals 
to restrict output. 
78. See United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965), rehg. denied, 393 U.S. 
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laws private parties' efforts to lobby or petition government for 
favorable economic treatment. 
Of the other nine cases involving access to distribution outlets, the 
necessary conditions appear to be met only in The American Film The-
atre, Inc. v. Universal Film Exchanges, Inc. 79 The plaintiff complained 
that because of pressure from major film distributors, exhibitors re-
fused to schedule its film series. The exhibitors nevertheless permitted 
interruptions of their feature presentations for other special events 
such as children's films. 80 Presumably the harsher treatment toward 
the plaintiff reflects a higher elasticity of demand between its offerings 
(artistic movies appealing to adults) and major first-run films. No ad-
ditional information concerning the likely merit of the claim is avail-
able, and the Georgetown case records indicate the claim was 
dismissed. But we allow for the possibility that the denial of access to 
a substantial number of outlets could prevent the plaintiff from realiz-
ing economies in the distribution and exhibition of its product. 
The other cases involving access to retail markets do' not appear to 
meet the essential requirements for anticompetitive exclusion. The 
product market and geographic markets include retail liquor prod-
ucts, 81 toys and candy in the Chicago area,82 milk and related prod-
ucts in New York City, 83 pharmaceuticals in the New York City 
area, 84 artistic supplies in the United States, 85 and groceries in 
California. 86 
One case in this group illustrates the potential for misuse of the 
antitrust laws. In Warehouse Wines & Spirits v. Safeway Inc., 87 plain-
tiff complained of lack of access to retail outlets, but the claim in fact 
was triggered by defendant Safeway's entry into the retail liquor busi-
1045 (1969); Eastern R.R. Conference Presidents v: Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 
(1961), rehg. denied, 365 U.S. 875 (1961). · 
79. No. 75-0033 (S.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 6, 1975), in Georgetown Project! supra note 15. 
80. American Film Theater Charges Major Motion Picture Companies with Exhibition Black 
Listing, Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 699, at A-23 (Feb. 4, 1975). 
81. J.W.T., Inc. v. Sichel, Inc., No. 73-1195 (N.D. Ill. filed May 9, 1973), in Georgetown 
Project, supra note 15. 
82. Irwin Askenazy dba Ash Dist. v. The B. Manischewitz Co., No. 77-4757 (N.D. Ill. filed 
Dec. 23, 1977), in Georgetown Project, supra note 15. 
83. Dairy Chain, Inc. v. Waldbaum's, Inc., No. 73-4337 (S.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 11, 1973), in 
Georgetown Project, supra note 15. 
84. Charles Labs, Inc. v. Banner, No. 74-4395 (S.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 7, 1974), in Georgetown 
Project, supra note 15. 
85. Robert Simmons, Inc. v. Binney & Smith, Inc., No. 75-4741 (S.D.N.Y. filed Sept. 26, 
1975), in Georgetown Project, supra note 15. 
86. Boardwalk Markets, Inc. v. Associated Food Stores, No. 76-0365 (N.D. Cal. filed Feb. 
20, 1976), in Georgetown Project, supra note 15. 
87. No. 81-4788 (N.D. Cal. filed Feb. 20, 1976), in Georgetown Project, supra note 15. 
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ness through wholly owned "liquor barns." Hence, the substantive 
complaint derived not from a restriction of input supply, but from an 
increase in the retail space devoted to the product and the competition 
that followed. The case was dismissed with prejudice. 
In sum, only two of the ten cases involving claims of harm to rivals 
through denial of access to distribution outlets appear to have met the 
core necessary conditions for such claims. It is reasonable to conclude 
that many of the other cases represent misuse of the antitrust remedy. 
Cases involving exclusive contractual arrangements. Thirteen of the 
competitor cases focus on exclusive contracts between buyers and sell-
ers. In two of the three cases involving transportation services, 88 the 
services were not regulated and the defendants were not in monopoly-
like positions. Moreover, the services did not require any special 
skills, which reduces the probability of entry by new sellers with signif-
icantly different costs - a necessary condition for the Aghion and 
Bolton scenario. 89 In the other case involving transportation serv-
ices,90 plaintiff sought entry into the business of transferring air freight 
to and from airline terminals at Chicago's O'Hare airport. The Civil 
Aeronautics Board approved a process whereby the defendant, the air 
carriers' agent, would contract with local carriers to provide the serv-
ices. The plaintiff complained that despite the parties' satisfaction 
with the contracts between the defendant and five local carriers, its 
application to share in the business should have been accepted.91 De-
fendant's motion for summary judgment, which argued that the Fed-
eral Aviation Act permitted such practices, was granted. But the 
extensive opinion on the motion indicates that the litigation involved 
considerable resources and addressed in detail the question of whether 
the contracting procedures were consistent with overall public policy 
goals. 
Two cases involving exclusive contracts are clear-cut examples of 
misuse of the private antitrust remedy. Rather than the situation envi-
sioned by Aghion and Bolton of a more efficient entrant denied access 
to markets, these cases were filed by incumbent firms, which were dis-
placed by competitors. In Diners' Club, Inc. v. Air Canada, 92 plaintiff 
sought to continue a contract offering credit card services. Similarly, 
88. Big T Lines, Inc. v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., No. 76-0862 (N.D. Cal. filed Apr. 26, 
1976); C.W. Limousine, Inc. v. Rothengast, No. 76-0791 (N.D. Ill. filed Mar. 2, 1976), i11 
Georgetown Project, supra note 15. 
89. See Aghion & Bolton, supra note 50, at 389-90. 
90. Big Bear Cartage, Inc. v. Air Cargo, Inc., 419 F. Supp. 982 (N.D. Ill. 1976). 
91. 419 F. Supp. at 984-85. 
92. No. 78-6209 (S.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 27, 1978), in Georgetown Project, supra note 15. 
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in Abadir & Co. v. Industria Quimicas de Mexico, 93 the plaintiff, a for-
mer exclusive agent of the defendant chemical producers, sought rein-
statement. The Aghion and Belton scenario, concerned as it is with 
the efficiency losses that occur when prospective entrants are deterred 
not because of their costs but because of the artificial barriers created 
by the liquidated damages contracts, has no applicability to the case of 
an incumbent seller ousted by the entry of new competitors. 
M.K. Metals, Inc. v. National Steel Co. 94 better fits the Aghion and 
Bolton scenario. The plaintiff objected to the use of exclusive con-
tracts between major steel companies and recyclers of aluminum, steel, 
and other metals used in various containers including beverage cans. 
The plaintiff claimed it had developed a new and more efficient tech-
nology, and argued that the contracts prevented it from obtaining raw 
inputs and from selling recycled products back to the steel companies. 
However, M.K Metals fails to meet the core necessary conditions for 
the Aghion and Bolton scenario. The parties to these contracts were 
not in a monopoly position of any consequence. In fact, metal 
container producers have limited market power due to the degree of 
substitutability with glass, plastics, and paper. Suppliers of recycled 
metals have even less power to bargain for excessive liquidated damage 
provisions. Hence, it is more likely that the parties would enter into 
exclusive contracts, not to exclude more efficient recyclers of metals, 
but for efficiency reasons.9s 
One case in this group raises the issue of contract duration. In 
Variety Theater and Dinner Club Inc. v. Carriage Trade Advertising 
Corp., 96 plaintiff objected to six-month exclusive contracts between ad-
vertisers and a coupon book publisher. Since advertisers have good 
alternative means of offering discounts, for example, through newspa-
per advertising and direct mailings, the advertisers would not agree to 
unfavorable terms such as a prohibition of dealing with rival publish-
ers unless the contract offered advantages. The likelihood that six-
month contracts in this context inhibit entry is very low, and the ex-
clusive contracts may yield benefits from increased circulation and 
effectiveness. 
93. No. 76-1938 (N.D. Cal. filed Sept. 10, 1976), in Georgetown Project, supra note 15. 
94. No. 79-1661 (N.D. Ill. filed Apr. 12, 1979), in Georgetown Project, supra note 15. 
95. One reason might be that the quality of inputs may vary, which, if exclusive contracts are 
not used, tends to raise transaction costs. In the tuna processing industry, as analyzed by Ed-
ward Gallick, agreements to sell all inputs (metals to be recycled) limit the incentives of suppliers 
to adjust the quality mix of inputs. EDWARD c. GALLICK, U.S. FED. TRADE COMMN., EXCLU-
SIVE DEALING AND VERTICAL INTEGRATION: THE EFFICIENCY OF CONTRACTS IN THE TUNA 
INDUSTRY 93, 93-94 (1984). 
96. No. 78-0704 (N.D. Ga. filed Apr. 19, 1978), in Georgetown Project, supra note 15. 
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In sum, our analysis indicates that· virtually none of these cases 
could be meritorious and that several are clear-cut misuses of the pri-
vate a~titrust remedy.97 
Claims of predation. Ten cases allege price predation.98 Arguing 
that such conduct amounts to a horizontal restraint of trade in viola-
tion of Sherman Act section 199 requires that the plaintiffs complain of 
joint price-cutting, as did the plaintiff in DiGiorgio Corp. v. Amstar 
Corp. 100 But it is not clear how many of the remaining cases could be 
viewed as horizontal restraints in violation of section 1. Rather, in 
substantive terms, the plaintiffs allege attempted monopolization in vi-
olation of section 2 of the Sherman Act. 101 The effects of the conduct 
are allegedly horizontal. 
The elementary conditions for successful predation, namely sub-
stantial market share and entry barriers in the product market, are not 
met in most of these cases. In the DiGiorgio case, the product market 
was individual servings of sugar and condiments. Excluding one or 
many rivals by predation would not permit the exercise of market 
power, as the inputs (sugar, condiments, packaging) are in abundant 
supply relative to the product market. In Canadian Ace Brewing Co. 
v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 102 the allegations concerned the U.S. 
beer market. The plaintiff's naming Schlitz, then a struggling firm 
with a small and· dwindling market share, as a defendant is in itself 
nearly sufficient to indicate that a predation claim lacked merit. The 
plaintiff, which complained that Schlitz "discriminated in price among 
different wholesale purchasers of their malt beverages,"103 sought 
damages from an unsuccessful attempt to enter the market. In M & R 
Laboratories, Inc. v. Trewax Co., 104 plaintiff sued an upstream supplier 
97. In Poirot Exhibitors Serv. Corp. v. Chicago Auto. Trade Assn., No. 78-0672 (N.D. Ill. 
filed Feb. 22, 1978), in Georgetown Project, supra note lS, for example, the product market is 
labor services for trade shows. In SRA-Triumvera v. B. Polisky & J. Agrest, No. 82-3191 (N.D. 
Ill. filed May 26, 1982), in Georgetown Project, supra note IS, the product market is real estate 
agent services. In each case, the labor services provided are in abundant supply relative to the 
specific uses cited in the litigation. Exclusive contractual arrangements, therefore, could not 
cause an increase in the market price of the labor services to other uses nor could they limit in 
any significant way the market opportunities for rival suppliers of the services. 
98. Two cases in this subset involve the pricing of cars by independent auto dealers. The 
remaining cases deal with the retail pricing of liquor, soft drinks, and designer jeans. 
99. IS U.S.C. § I (1988). 
100. No. 76-0S44 (N.D. Cal. filed Mar. 16, 1976), in Georgetown Project, supra note IS. 
101. IS U.S.C. § 2 (1988). 
102. 629 F.2d 1183 (7th Cir. 1980); see also Canadian Ace Brewing Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, 
Inc., 448 F. Supp. 769 (N.D. Ill. 1978), ajfd., 601 F.2d S93 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 
884 (1979). 
103. Schlitz. 629 F.2d at 1184. 
104. No. 78-1224 (N.D. Cal. filed Apr. 7, 1978), in Georgetown Project, supra note IS. 
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as well as rival agents as a means to force dealing. 
Other product markets cited in this group of cases include (1) mo-
bile check cashing services, 105 (2) management services for musi-
cians, 106 (3) plastic produce bags, 107 ( 4) residential hot water 
heaters,108 (5) rental of cleaning equipment,109 and (6) package deliv-
ery services.110 Of these, the two claims alleging predation in package 
delivery services are comparatively strong given the defendant, 
U.P.S., 111 had substantial market share in the product market (trans-
portation of garments in New York City and other local markets) and 
that network and scale economies might constitute a reentry 
barrier. 112 
In the last case, Consolidated Terminal Systems, Inc. v. ITI' World 
Communications Inc., 113 it appears that the judge correctly granted 
the defendants' motion to dismiss: plaintiff complained that the five 
telex companies authorized by the FCC to provide international telex 
services had cut prices on related equipment below cost. Since the 
telex equipment market includes large national markets as well, the 
alleged cross-subsidization could not have led to monopolization of 
the equipment market.114 
2. Other Claims 
Agreements among competitors. Four of the cases deal with agree-
ments among competitors and so resemble classical horizontal re-
105. Thillens, Inc. v. Community Currency Exch. Assn. of Ill., Inc., 729 F.2d 1128 (7th Cir. 
1984), cert dismissed, Thillens, Inc. v. Wall, 469 U.S. 976 (1984). 
106. Shaw Concerts, Inc. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., No. 75-4278 (S.D.N.Y. 
filed Aug. 28, 1975), in Georgetown Project, supra note 15. 
107. Trans-International Trading Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., No. 77-0858 (N.D. Cal. filed Apr. 
27, 1977), in Georgetown Project, supra note 15. 
108. Hoyt Heater Co. ofN. Cal. v. American Appliance Mfg. Co., 502 F. Supp. 1383 (N.D. 
Cal. 1980). 
109. M & R Lab., Inc. v. Trewax Co., No. 78-1224 (N.D. Cal. filed Apr. 7, 1978), in Ge-
orgetown Project, supra note 15. 
110. Broadway Delivery Corp. v. United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc., 651 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 
1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 968 (1981); Barnet's Express, Inc. v. United Parcel Serv. of Am., 
Inc., No. 80-2260 (S.D.N.Y. filed Apr. 23, 1980), in Georgetown Project, supra note 15. The 
disputes concerned the transportation of garments in New York City and other local markets. 
111. Broadway Delivery, 651 F.2d 122; Barnet's Express, No. 80-2260. The disputes con-
cerned the transportation of garments in New York City and other local markets. 
112. These same economies also suggest, however, that the costs of an additional account 
might be quite low, in which case prices can be cut substantially yet still not be below cost. 
113. 535 F. Supp. 225 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). 
114. The court, however, misapplied the case law on tie-ins in evaluating the plaintiff's 
claims. Specifically, in the course of rejecting the plaintiff's claims of injury in its attempts to 
compete for international accounts, the court viewed telex equipment as the "tying" product 
rather than the international services where entry was regulated by the FCC. 535 F. Supp. at 
229-30. 
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straints. But, as might be expected, the plaintiffs' interests in the 
matters differ from those of fringe competitors. A unique claim arose 
out of efforts by foreign firms that export coffee to the United States to 
raise and fix the price of Angolan coffee to limit their losses from long 
positions they had taken in futures market trading.1 15 Competing U.S. 
importers had taken short positions that, absent the conspiracy, would 
have produced substantial profits. 
GAF Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co. 116 yielded the only substantial 
settlement ($16.6 million) that became known to the public from the 
seventy-four competitor cases. GAF, a designer of cameras, alleged 
that Kodak, Sylvania, and General Electric had conspired to deny the 
flow of technical information concerning new product developments 
(the "magicube" and "flipflash") to GAF. According to the claim, the 
conspiracy allowed Kodak to introduce cameras embodying the new 
technologies in advance of GAF. 
Ace Agencies v. Seaboard Shipping Co., 117 involves allegations of 
the exercise of classical market power and efforts to restrain noncomp-
liant competitors. The plaintiff leased blocks of cargo space from ship-
pers in the Trans-Atlantic Ocean Shipping Conference and from those 
outside of the conference, and then supplied these services in competi-
tion with the shippers. The plaintiff complained of coercive efforts by 
defendant members of the conference to enforce the pricing structure. 
Shannon v. Crowley 118 is one of two cases119 advancing similar 
claims by competitor plaintiffs with respect to conduct of two defend-
ants that were under common ownership and together accounted for 
seventy percent of the tugboat service business in San Francisco 
harbors. Plaintiffs asserted that defendants violated the Sherman Act 
by refusing to cooperate with plaintiffs and other rivals when assist-
ance was needed in moving large vessels. 120 Plaintiffs also challenged 
115. Cofinco, Inc. v. Angola Coffee Co., No. 74-5191 (S.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 26, 1974), in 
Georgetown Project, supra note 15. 
116. 519 F. Supp. 1203 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
117. No. 81-1391 (N.D. Ill. filed Mar. 12, 1981), in Georgetown Project, supra note 15. 
118. 538 F. Supp. 476 (N.D. Cal. 1981). The case was originally filed, and appeared in The 
Georgetown Sample, as Murphy Pacific Marine Salvage Co. v. Thomas B. Crowley, No 74-0562 
(N.D. Cal. filed Mar. 12, 1974). Plaintiff Shannon was trustee in bankruptcy for Murphy Pacific 
Marine Salvage Company, which brought an antitrust action against Crowley for the period 
March 1970 to October 1971. Shannon, 538 F. Supp. at 479. 
119. The second case covering the period from October 1971 to September 1975, is Murphy 
Tugboat Co. v. Crowley, 454 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (Murphy I), sub nom. Murphy 
Tugboat Co. v. Shipowners & Merchants Towboat Co., 467 F. Supp. 841 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (Mur-
phy II), ajfd., Murphy Tugboat Co. v. Crowley, 658 F.2d 1256 (9th Cir. 1981) cert. denied, 455 
U.S. 1018 (1982). The two cases were consolidated for discovery purposes. The relationship 
between the two cases is explained in Shannon, 538 F. Supp. at 479. 
120. Murphy /l 467 F. Supp. at 847. 
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an agreement between defendants and defendants' employee pilots 
pursuant to which the pilots supplied complementary inland piloting 
services only to the defendants' customers at prices lower than those 
charged by independent pilots. 121 As a result, plaintiffs were required 
to lower tugboat fees to remain competitive. In Shannon (the case in 
the Georgetown sample), the district court dismissed the complaint on 
the ground that the damage claim was too speculative.122 In the re-
lated case (Murphy Tugboat), the district court granted defendant's 
motion for judgment nothwithstanding the verdict after the jury found 
for plaintiff on both of its claims. The court found that the pilots' 
agreement was within the labor exemption from the antitrust laws, 123 
and that the damage verdict was "too speculative to stand."124 
Vertical restraints. The defendant in Alloy International Co. v. 
Hoover-Nsk Bearings, Inc. 125 refused to sell bearings to the distributor 
plaintiff due to an agreement between the defendant and another dis-
tributor. But like many vertical restraints cases, the refusal apparently 
was intended to establish property rights for the other distributor to 
develop the market. In Olympic Distributors, Inc. v. Steinlauf 126 
which is representative of the other cases in this category, the plaintiff 
complained of coercion to force the plaintiff to adopt the retail price 
structure for sports equipment. Although such cases may ultimately 
involve exclusion, 127 we classified these cases separately because often 
the primary goal of such behavior is to influence the marketing efforts 
and the downstream prices of a manufacturer's product. It is beyond 
the scope of this article to evaluate the likely merit of such claims, and 
such an exercise would duplicate extensive research in the area of re-
sale price maintenance and related vertical restraints. 
D. Summary Evaluation of Competitor Cases 
Evaluating the likely merit of a large sample of cases is difficult, 
121. 467 F. Supp. at 848. 
122. Shannon, 538 F. Supp. at 484. 
123. Murphy II. 467 F. Supp. at 855-56. 
124. Murphy II, 467 F. Supp. at 850-52. Murphy I is of some particular interest because in a 
preliminary ruling the court relied on Brunswick in holding that plaintiff could not recover dam-
ages suffered when defendant priced at levels below plaintiff's prices but above its own variable 
costs. The court concluded that recovery of damages measured by the price level plaintiff would 
have charged had defendant raised its prices above its total costs would be inconsistent with the 
antitrust injury requirement. 454 F. Supp. at 852-56. 
125. 635 F.2d 1222 (7th Cir. 1980). 
126. Olympic Distrib., Inc. v. Steinlauf, No. 74-3217 (N.D. Ill. filed Nov. 8, 1974), in Ge-
orgetown Project, supra note 15. 
127. In fact, the plaintiff in Olympic Distributors claimed that a key element of the coercion 
was an attempt to discourage suppliers from dealing with the plaintiff. 
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but less so given that the basic principles of antitrust economics are, as 
we argued in section II.B, relevant to most models of exclusionary 
behavior. The benefit from such a review lies in deriving a sense of the 
distribution of merit in the sample of cases. For some cases, we did 
not find any information indicative of likely merit. Among the bal-
ance of cases for which information is available, the proportion of ap-
parently low merit cases that allege exclusion is large. Indeed, the 
available evidence indicates that only a small minority of the cases 
filed by competitors in the category of horizontal restraints appears to 
meet the fundamental necessary conditions as identified above to per-
mit exclusionary practices. In several cases, it is clear that the plain-
tiffs object to actions that represent increases in competition. Whether 
further research along these lines would corroborate these findings is 
not known, but they provide a reasonable basis for generalizations 
about the merit of competitor cases.12s 
It also appears from our review of seventy-four competitor cases 
that screens and filters based on "core" necessary conditions could be 
used to eliminate many low merit cases. This would further protect 
against unnecessary private antitrust actions. Nevertheless, the review 
identified several cases that would survive screening and would re-
quire, therefore, an evaluation on the merits. Overall, our analysis 
raises two questions. First, can standing and injury rules or other 
rules that encourage the use of screens be developed to eliminate in the 
early stages of litigation those cases lacking merit? Second, can the 
courts effectively deal with those cases where plaintiffs succeed in 
making plausible claims concerning exclusionary conduct? We ad-
dress these questions in the two Parts that follow. 
Ill. BRUNSWICK'S EFFECT ON COMPETITOR CLAIMS 
The Supreme Court's 1977 decision in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo 
Bowl-0-Mat, Inc., 129 establishes that plaintiffs in private treble damage 
actions may not recover damages for any and every injury that can 
somehow be said to relate to an antitrust violation. Plaintiff must es-
tablish "antitrust injury," that is, "injury of the type the antitrust laws 
were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes de-
fendants' acts unlawful."130 In Brunswick, plaintiff challenged the ac-
quisition of several bowling centers by a competitor. Plaintiff claimed 
injury of lost profits that plaintiff would have made had the acquired 
128. An exception concerns competitor claims regarding tie-ins; these were not part of our 
sample. 
129. 429 U.S. 477 (1977). 
130. 429 U.S. at 489. 
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centers closed. Plaintiff's claim of injury thus rested on the premise 
that the acquisition increased competition. For this reason, the Court 
ruled that the plaintiff suffered no antitrust injury and therefore could 
not recover damages.131 
Clearly, the Brunswick antitrust injury requirement is no bar to 
actions brought by customers or suppliers seeking to recover for 
overcharges. It could, however, be a significant barrier to actions 
brought by competitors. A competitor asserting that other competi-
tors in the same market have restricted output and raised prices 
through collusion, for example, has not suffered antitrust injury. 
Other cases, including Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. 
Zenith Radio Corp., 132 affirmed this point. Similarly, a competitor 
may not challenge a merger or joint venture on the conventional 
ground that it will increase concentration, facilitate collusion, and thus 
raise prices. 
Because the Brunswick opinion was rendered in the middle of the 
time period covered by the sample, the Georgetown project data per-
mit an inquiry into the rule's effect on the relative frequency of com-
petitor cases and their disposition. If Brunswick did limit the ability of 
plaintiffs to allege certain violations, then the distribution of violations 
alleged and the pattern of dispositions might change as a result. Using 
the data presented below to investigate Brunswick's effectiveness, how-
ever, presents a number of difficulties. First and foremost, the conse-
quences we might observe depend on the legal rules, particularly those 
relating to standing to sue, that were in effect in the districts covered 
by the Georgetown project sample. Brunswick may have caused a sig-
nificant change in some districts but not in others. As a practical mat-
ter, this requires an examination of the governing law in each federal 
judicial circuit. Unfortunately, a review of the case law does not pro-
vide a good basis for categorizing the jurisdictions as either Brunswick-
like or not. 133 
Second, Brunswick's effect will depen~ on the substantive rules de-
fining illegal practices, including predation and monopolization. If 
those rules are not strict, competitors can meet the antitrust injury 
requirement by alleging, for example, that a prospective merger will 
131. 429 U.S. at 488-89. 
132. 475 U.S. 574, 583 (1986). 
133. This is in contrast to other circumstances. For example, both before and after the Illi-
nois Brick decision, the circuit courts split on the relevant standing and injury rules. Beforehand, 
the courts differed on whether Hanover Shoe barred indirect purchaser suits, and disagreed after-
wards on the meaning of the cost-plus exception to the rule against such suits. See Illinois Brick 
Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, rehg. denied, 434 U.S. 881 (1977); Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe 
Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, rehg. denied, 393 U.S. 901 (1968). 
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either result in monopolization or predation. In such a legal environ-
ment, rather than deterring competitor claims Brunswick would en-
courage competitor plaintiffs to add allegations of monopolization, 
predation, and other forms of market exclusion to their complaints. 134 
On the other hand, in settings where the courts are critical of such 
claims, Brunswick might serve to reduce the frequency of competitor 
claims. 
Finally, changes in federal enforcement in the periods before and 
after Brunswick may confound the analysis. As Table 1 indicates, fed-
eral price-fixing cases tend to generate follow-on suits by customer 
plaintiffs. We would therefore expect the relative frequencies of com-
petitor and customer cases to vary as a function of the number, type, 
and success of federal price-fixing cases. Roughly coincident with the 
Supreme Court's Brunswick decision, criminal penalties for price-fix-
ing cases were increased from the misdemeanor to the felony level. 135 
In prior research, we have found (1) that this change led to reductions 
both in the number of significant price-fixing cases filed by the Anti-
trust Division and in the government's success rate,136 and (2) that 
since the late 1970s the proportion of follow-on to independently initi-
ated cases has fallen. 137 The higher proportion of independently initi-
ated cases alleging price-fixing since that time period would, other 
things being equal, increase the proportion of competitor suits, and so 
will tend to bias against observing Brunswick's influence in the gross 
statistics on plaintiff type. 
Because of the caveats noted above and the complexity and variety 
of factors influencing the measurement, the data we present in Table 4 
are only suggestive of Brunswick's effect. The table reports the pre-
and post-Brunswick distributions of plaintiff type for cases in the Ge-
orgetown Project sample that allege illegal horizontal restraints. (The 
134. For example, plaintiffs may argue that any price cut following a merger is predatory. 
Consumer and competitor interests diverge here, and the Supreme Court has noted that "cutting 
prices in order to increase business often is the very essence of competition." Matsushita, 475 
U.S. at 594. In Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 591 F. Supp. 683 (D. Colo. 1983), ajfd., 
761 F.2d 570 (10th Cir. 1985), revd., 479 U.S. 104 (1986), the plaintiff was concerned that the 
merged firm would expand output by working Saturdays, that this would cause a "price·cost" 
squeeze, and that this problem had persisted for twenty years. See U.S. Amicus Brief in Cargill, 
at 19 n.24 (referring to Record at 133-34). 
135. The penalties were increased to their current levels by the Antitrust Procedures and 
Penalties Act, Pub. L. No. 93-528, § 3, 88 Stat. 1708 (1974). 
136. Edward A. Snyder, The Effect of Higher Criminal Penalties on Antitrust Enforcement, 
33 J.L. & EcoN. 439 (1990). 
137. Kauper & Snyder, supra note 20, at 1178. Specifically we found, using the Georgetown 
Project data, that follow-on cases accounted for 11 % of cases in the period 1973-1977 and 6% in 
the period 1978-1983. (These figures exclude Multi-District Litigation cases.) More relevant, 
follow-on cases accounted for 37% of horizontal restraint cases in the period 1973-1977 and 20% 
of the same in the period 1978-1983. See Kauper & Snyder, supra note 20, at 1181-83. 
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pre- and post-Brunswick categories are based on the filing date.) Con-
sistent with expectations, the percentage of competitor plaintiffs in the 
horizontal restraints category fell from 28% to 20%, with the percent-
age of customer plaintiffs rising from 42% to 51 %. But the difference 
in the before and after distributions of plaintiffs is not statistically 
significant. 
TABLE 4. PLAINTIFF'S BUSINESS RELATIONSHIP TO DEFENDANT, 
PRE- AND POST-Brunswick 
Horizontal Restraint Cases 
Plaintiff's Business Relationship to Defendant 
Competitor Customer Supplier Dealer Other Total 
Pre-Brunswick 38 57 5 23 12 135 
row% 28% 42% 4% 17% 9% 
Post-Brunswick 36 89 7 31 13 176 
row% 20% 51% 4% 18% 7% 
Both Periods 74 146 12 54 25 311 
row% 24% 47% 4% 17% 8% 
All Other Cases 
Plaintiff's Business Relationship to Defendant 
Competitor Customer Supplier Dealer Other Total 
Pre-Brunswick 170 81 16 170 59 496 
row% 34% 16% 3% 34% 12% 
Post-Brunswick 301 127 33 218 97 776 
row% 39% 16% 4% 28% 13% 
Both Periods 471 208 49 388 156 1272 
row% 37% 16% 4% 31% 12% 
Table 5 shows the distributions of cases filed by all types of plain-
tiffs for the most common types of alleged violations. The data do not 
indicate that Brunswick shifted the distribution of violations alleged. 
The percentage of cases in the "Horizontal Restraints" category re-
mained at 20%; the percentage of cases in the "Merger, Joint Venture, 
Asset Accumulation" category remained at 7%. As suggested above, 
without detailed information about the substantive rules in place, one 
could not predict Brunswick's effect in this regard. 
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TABLE 5. DISTRIBUTION OF ALLEGED PRIMARY VIOLATIONS 
PRE- AND POST-BRUNSWICK 
Violation 
Pre- and 
Pre-Brunswick Post-Brunswick Post Brunswick 
Horizontal Restraints 139 190 329 
% of column total 20% 20% 20% 
Merger, Joint Venture 
or Asset Accumulation 49 66 115 
% of column total 7% 7% 7% 
Price Discrimination 70 76 146 
% of column total 10% 8% 9% 
Predatory Pricing 35 49 84 
% of column total 5% 5% 5% 
Tying 101 121 222 
% of column total 15% 13% 14% 
Refusal to DeaV 
Dealer Termination 143 237 380 
% of column total 21% 25% 23% 
Vertical Price 
Discrimination 22 28 50 
% of column total 3% 3% 3% 
Vertical Price-Fixing/ 
RPM 51 51 102 
% of column total 7% 5% 6% 
Monopoly 12 21 33 
% of column total 2% 2% 2% 
Other 62 119 181 
% of column total 9% 12% 11% 
Total 684 958 1642 
Regarding claim disposition, we present in Table 6 a breakdown of 
the outcomes for the competitor cases filed pre- and post-Brunswick. 
No clear pattern emerges from the data. Of course, we might not ex-
pect to see an increase in dismissals or successful defendant motions 
for summary judgment given adjustments in the filing decisions and 
the way plaintiffs plead their claims. Moreover, compared to the dis-
position of other claims in the Georgetown sample, the pre-Brunswick 
competitor claims include a relatively high proportion of dismissals. 138 
138. See Table 3 supra. 
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Method of Disposition 
Pre-Trial 
Dismissal Stipulation Settlement Litigation 
13 9 4 10" 
36% 25% 11% 28% 
12 9 2 8b 




This table excludes cases with dispositions categorized as Other Outcomes. 
See footnote 35. 
a Includes 5 grants of defendant motions for summary judgment. 
b Includes 3 grants of defendant motions for summary judgment. 
Overall, these data suggest that Brunswick did not have a signifi-
cant effect either in limiting competitor cases in the suspect category 
or in changing the distribution of cases by violation alleged.139 The 
division of the sample into pre- and post-Brunswick periods is, how-
ever, a crude test. Factors such as changes in federal enforcement ac-
tions, district-specific effects, and forum shopping may obscure the 
effects of Brunswick. 
IV. PROSPECTIVE ISSUES 
Our analysis to this point has identified two factors that favor al-
lowing competitor claims to go forward, and against changing the 
standing, injury, and liability standards that apply to such cases. 
First, a fairly high proportion of competitor cases are dismissed or end 
in a granting of defendant's motion for summary judgment, indicating 
that the courts already treat competitor cases with a healthy skepti-
cism. Second, the lack of competitor plaintiffs in private actions that 
follow federal enforcement actions suggests, as one would hope, that 
standing and injury rules do not allow plaintiffs to proceed with claims 
against their rivals that allege the exercise of classical market power. 
Indeed, the review of the claims in our sample indicates that competi-
tor claims most often raise the issue of anticompetitive exclusion. 
We believe, however, that under the current legal framework the 
139. One additional test might be performed. Though the distribution of case dispositions 
did not change much after Brunswick, it is possible that the dispositions correlated better with 
case merit. For example, following the decision, a higher percentage of the low-merit cases 
might have been dismissed and a lower percentage of the same might have proceeded to settle-
ment or litigation. 
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constraints on plaintiffs seeking to initiate improper claims are quite 
weak. With the incentives of competitors to impose costs on their ri-
vals and alter their behavior, claims of anticompetitive exclusion will 
likely be made more frequently than actual conditions justify. The 
question arises how well the courts will be able to deal with the claims 
that survive the types of screening suggested in Part II. Attempting to 
evaluate business practices on a case-by-case basis requires, of course, 
substantial resources. But even more troubling, in our view, are the 
difficulties the courts face in distinguishing between "exclusionary" ac-
tions that are likely to harm welfare from those that enhance it. In the 
balance of this Part, we elaborate on the legal issues concerning the 
antitrust injury requirement, and then analyze the severe problems the 
courts will encounter in making use of the recent literature on an-
ticompetitive exclusion. 
A. Legal Issues 
A private litigant's ability to pursue an antitrust claim is dependent 
not only upon establishing that defendant's conduct violated an anti-
trust statute, but also upon proof that the plaintiff is an appropriate 
claimant injured in fact by the violation. As required by Brunswick, 
plaintiffs must have standing to sue and must have suffered antitrust 
injury. Assessment of the potential for misuse of the private remedy 
must take into account the antitrust injury requirement, which is one 
of the available policy tools for curbing its use. 140 While our sample of 
cases contains little evidence that the antitrust injury requirement for-
mulated in Brunswick had an immediate effect on competitor claims, 
the question remains whether the requirement as now interpreted or as 
logically compelled will or can serve this function. 
Antitrust injury is sometimes said to be but one element of stand-
ing to sue. 141 But it is hard to envision a situation in which a firm 
suffers antitrust injury at the hands of its direct competitors and simul-
taneously lacks standing. Considerations of directness of injury and 
140. Other policy tools include the definition of antitrust damages and the effective multiplier 
used to determine the awards paid to successful plaintiffs. Easterbrook proposes that single, 
rather than treble, damages be awarded to competitor plaintiffs who prevail in their litigation. 
See Frank H. Easterbrook, Detrebling Antitrust Damages, 28 J.L. & EcoN. 445 (1985). Others, 
including Polinsky, have argued that damages be "de-coupled" when private enforcers tend to be 
too zealous. See Mitchell A. Polinsky, Detrebling versus Decoupling Antitrust Damages: Lessons 
from the Theory of Enforcement, 74 GEO. L.J. 1231, 1235 (1986). 
141. See PHILLIPE. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW~ 334.3 (Supp. 
1990). Whether or not this is so may be of some consequence with respect to several procedural 
matters, but is of little relevance here. Regardless of how the antitrust injury requirement is 
viewed, it is not synonymous with standing, which encompasses considerations of remoteness, 
complexity, duplication of recoveries and avoidance of multiplicity of lawsuits arising out of the 
same conduct. See id. A plaintiff might have suffered antitrust injury and still lack standing. 
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duplication of recovery may lead to a denial of standing to such parties 
as employees, shareholders, or suppliers of injured firms, 142 but have 
little relevance in suits against direct competitors. The issue here, 
then, is the ability of courts to limit abuses of antitrust litigation 
against direct competitors through use of the antitrust injury 
requirement. 
In Brunswick itself, the claimed injury derived from conduct that 
increased competition. In this respect Brunswick was an easy case, 
establishing (or confirming) the principle that conduct which en-
hanced competition could not cause a cognizable injury.143 The re-
quirement, however, is broader than the simple proposition that 
plaintiffs will not be permitted recoveries or equitable relief based on 
injuries resulting from competitive behavior. A symmetry must exist 
between the anticompetitive effects established in proving a violation 
and the injury suffered by plaintiff. In other words, the injury claimed 
by plaintiff must match the rationale for finding a violation in the first 
place.144 
The cases in which the antitrust injury requirement is obviously 
satisfied include those filed by customers seeking damages for 
overcharges resulting from a cartel among its suppliers.145 The same 
is true of a firm excluded from an essential facility operated by its 
direct competitors.146 Conversely, a firm claiming to be injured be-
cause its direct competitors conspired to raise prices - the classic car-
tel - has not, at least in the absence of some additional and 
cognizable adverse effects, suffered antitrust injury.147 As a general 
rule, a plaintiff alleging only that its own competitors have restricted 
competition among themselves will fail to establish antitrust injury. 148 
Competitor plaintiffs must claim an injury arising out of something 
other than increased prices caused by the enhancement of market 
power. 
142. See PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 1111 336d, 338, 340e 
(1978); AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 141, 1111 338, 340.1. 
143. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 141, 11 334.2a. 
144. See Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 110 S. Ct. 1884, 1893 (1990) (stating 
that the antitrust injury requirement "ensures that the harm claimed by the plaintiff corresponds 
to the rationale for finding a violation in the first place"). In Brunswick, plaintiff retailer claimed, 
but did not prove, that a merger was unlawful because it enabled the merged firm to engage in 
predation; it had sought to recover damages on the ground that without the merger plaintiff 
would have benefited because the acquired firm would not have survived. Brunswick Corp. v. 
Pueblo Bowl-0-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 481 (1977). 
145. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 141, 11 337.1. 
146. Cf id. at 1111340.1-.2 (plaintiff who is damaged by boycott engaged in by direct competi-
tors suffers antitrust injury; essential facility claim is similar). 
147. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 583 (1986). 
148. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 141, 1111 340.2c, 340.2d. 
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If the antitrust injury requirement of Brunswick, as now inter-
preted, precludes suit by firms against direct competitors in those cases 
where the litigation itself is likely to be an anticompetitive tactic, there 
would be little reason to fear abuse of antitrust proceedings by compet-
itors and, therefore, little reason to consider further changes in anti-
trust remedies. Ideally the antitrust injury requirement should 
preclude plaintiffs from seeking damages or injunctive relief against 
direct competitors in cases where the only adverse consumer welfare 
effects are price increases resulting from the elimination of competi-
tion among the defendants. This category of cases would include, in-
ter alia, conventional cartel conduct and horizontal merger cases 
where illegality rests on standard likelihood of collusion grounds. 
Ultimately, the concept of antitrust injury depends upon the stan-
dards courts apply in determining whether the business practices in 
question constitute a violation. If the violation rests entirely upon 
proof of likely adverse price and output effects - the standard applied 
to the issue of liability today - then a plaintiff must establish that its 
injuries result from those same price and output effects.149 Courts in 
many cases may establish at the outset of litigation without much dis-
covery or a full trial whether the antitrust injury requirement is met. 
Where a plaintiff fails to plead a type of injury that "matches" the 
violation the case will be dismissed. The antitrust injury requirement 
thus both limits and shapes the types of cases plaintiffs file at the out-
set. Many cases may also be dismissed later in the litigation process if 
plaintiffs cannot establish the facts on which their theories of antitrust 
injury are based. In some cases this may not be evident until the con-
clusion of the trial.150 
All of the Supreme Court cases in which plaintiffs were held to 
lack antitrust injury, including its 1990 decision in Atlantic Richfield 
Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 151 have involved suits brought by competi-
tors. While this may suggest that the Court is aware of the potential 
misuse of the antitrust remedy by competitors, the antitrust injury re-
149. But tomorrow antitrust standards could shift; the antitrust injury requirement then 
would change. Suppose that in the future a violation might be found, where price and output 
effects are beneficial, on the ground that the conduct nevertheless injures small businesses. Low 
but nonpredatory pricing of exactly the type involved in Monforl could be such a case, assuming 
a shift in standards. If a violation is so established, such harm to a small business plaintiff would 
constitute antitrust injury. But so long as violation of the antitrust laws rests on proof of adverse 
price and output effects, a plaintiff's injuries must be directly related to the specific adverse price 
and output effects on which a finding of violation is based. 
150. See the discussion in AREEDA & HoVENKAMP, supra note 141, ~ 334.3b. 
151. 110 S. Ct. 1884 (1990). In Allanlic Richfield, a gasoline retailer brought suit against an 
integrated refiner that sold through its own retail outlets and to independents as well. Plaintiffs 
in Brunswick. Ma1Sushi1a and Mo11for1 were all direct competitors of defendants. 
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quirement is hardly a bar to all such suits. Of most relevance here, 
competitors who are driven out of the market "along the way" can 
claim they are victims of the very conduct giving rise to the violation. 
They have suffered antitrust injury and may seek damages. Competi-
tors threatened by such conduct will be able to seek injunctive relief. 
This is the effect of the Supreme Court's 1987 ruling in Cargill, Inc. v. 
Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 152 in which the Court denied injunctive re-
lief to a competitor challenging the merger of two other competitors. 
The plaintiff alleged that the acquisition would result in a price 
squeeze of competitors, with prices significantly reduced for some pe-
riod of time. The Court concluded that if prices would be lower, but 
still above cost, no antitrust injury would occur. In Monfort, plaintiff 
failed to allege truly predatory pricing or predatory intent. The Court 
clearly indicated, however, that had there been proper allegation and 
proof of threatened predation, the antitrust injury requirement would 
have been met. 153 Within weeks of the Monfort decision, the district 
court in Tasty Baking Co. v. Ralston Purina Co., Inc. 154 found that a 
competitor challenging a horizontal merger satisfied the Brunswick 
and Monfort standards by alleging that the acquisition would likely 
result in its exclusion from the market and predatory pricing.155 
The lesson for competitor plaintiffs is clear. Allegations of an-
ticompetitive exclusion, if properly framed, will satisfy the antitrust 
injury requirement. The question then becomes one of proof and, for 
all practical purposes, the case must proceed to the merits. In section 
1 and 2 cases, where the alleged conduct has already taken place, the 
critical issues are whether the conduct violated antitrust standards. In 
merger cases the court is confronted with the additional issue of 
whether the exercise of market power to exclude, which has not yet 
occurred, is likely to occur. In these circumstances, since careful 
pleading at the outset can satisfy the antitrust injury requirement, it 
will not control competitors' spurious and, in many cases, anticompe-
152. 479 U.S. 104 (1986). The plaintiff (Monfort) claimed that "IBP and Excel would en-
gage in a price-cost 'squeeze' bidding up the price of necessary raw product input supply (fed 
cattle) while at the same time lowering the cost offinished output product (boxed beet)." 591 F. 
Supp. 683, 691 (D. Colo. 1983). The Supreme Court stated that the plaintiff's claim was "noth-
ing more than an allegation of losses due to vigorous competition." 479 U.S. at 108. 
153. 479 U.S. at 120-22; see discussion in AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 141, 
~~ 340.2b, 340.2f. 
154. 653 F. Supp. 1250 (E.D. Pa. 1987). 
155. The competitor plaintiff's success in Tasty Baking is attributable in part to narrow mar-
ket definition ("snack cakes and pies," which excluded brownies, doughnuts, cookies, and other 
pastries). 653 F. Supp. at 1257-60. The court found "antitrust injury" both in plaintiff's claim of 
threatened predation, which it asserted as a grounds for attacking the merger and to support a 
section 2 claim, and in its allegation that the merged entity would impair plaintiff's business by 
extracting more shelf space and promotional benefits from retailers. 653 F. Supp. at 1255. 
586 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 90:551 
titive litigation. The apparently limited effect of Brunswick found in 
Part III is consistent with this conclusion. 
The way the courts have dealt with allegations of predation is in-
structive. The relationship between such allegations and antitrust in-
jury is problematic. When pricing is predatory, adverse price and 
output effects occur only if predation is successful, i.e., if defendant or 
defendants actually drive the plaintiff from the market and thereafter 
increase price over those previously prevailing. Until this occurs, 
however, consumers in fact benefit. When prices do rise, consumers 
suffer antitrust injury and competitors still in the market benefit (and, 
therefore, do not then suffer antitrust injury). But what of the firm 
destroyed or otherwise damaged by predation, the firm that is the 
"victim" along the way? Does the antitrust injury requirement allow 
only actions for damages arising out of the price increases resulting 
from successful predation?156 
The Monfort decision indicates that a firm could seek to enjoin a 
merger of two of its direct competitors if the merger posed the threat 
of future predation. Lower courts have followed this lead, finding the 
antitrust injury requirement met in such circumstances if the threat of 
predation is sufficiently real to hold the merger unlawful in the first 
place.157 While these are cases seeking injunctive relief, lower court 
decisions have proceeded similarly in damage actions, holding that 
while the ultimate reason for condemning predation is consumer 
harm, the means through which such harm is caused is injury to rivals 
and that such injury must necessarily satisfy the standards of Bruns-
wick 158 Plaintiffs in these cases are allowed to proceed simply because 
of the prospect of consumer harm. The question of the proximity of 
adverse consumer effects to time of suit (or the predatory acts) is never 
addressed. It is sufficient that, within the market in question, acts 
156. In such cases customers, but not competitors, would be the parties suffering antitrust 
injury. See discussion in AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 141, ~ 340.2b. 
157. See McCaw Personal Communications, Inc. v. Pacific Telesis Group, 645 F. Supp. 1166 
(N.D. Cal. 1986); Tasty Baking Co. v. Ralston Purina, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 1250 (E.D. Pa. 1987). 
158. See Multiftex, Inc. v. Samuel Moore & Co., 709 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 
465 U.S. 1100 (1984). Cf Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commn. v. National Football 
League, 791 F.2d 1356, 1364 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 826 (1987) (stating that 
where defendant league violated the antitrust laws by preventing the move of the Oakland Raid· 
ers professional football team to Los Angeles, thereby depriving Los Angeles consumers of the 
choice between two teams, the Raiders' claim for damages based on the loss of incremental 
revenues it would have earned in Los Angeles was not barred by the antitrust injury require-
ment). Similarly, courts have simply assumed without discussion that a firm injured by preda-
tory pricing may seek damages based on its losses without regard to whether the predation 
succeeded and thereby brought about higher prices. See, e.g., Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grin· 
nell Corp., 724 F.2d 227 (1st Cir. 1983); William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental 
Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982). 
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likely to have such effects sometime might occur and might injure the 
plaintiff. 
In cases seeking to enjoin mergers of firms competing with the 
plaintiff, courts must struggle with proof of potential predation. In 
these cases, the predatory acts alleged have not yet occurred. How 
should courts determine their likelihood? How proximate must such 
acts be?159 Presumably plaintiff must do more than allege such future 
acts. But neither the Supreme Court nor lower courts have offered 
guidance on such questions. The mere act of pleading that such con-
duct is likely will apparently carry the plaintiff a long way into the 
litigation. Damage actions will seldom pose these questions; presuma-
bly predatory conduct already will have occurred. 
To sum up to this point, plaintiffs claiming injuries through strate-
gic or predatory actions of their competitors are likely to satisfy the 
antitrust injury requirement once the facts establishing the violation 
are shown. The courts tend to presume that the factual premise of the 
claim is valid and then inquire whether the plaintiffs stand to suffer 
antitrust injury from the alleged behavior. Because the antitrust in-
jury requirement is not likely to serve as a significant limitation on 
such actions, plaintiffs suing direct competitors may be expected to 
shape their complaints to conform to current theories of predation or 
raising rivals' costs. Such complaints are likely to withstand initial 
scrutiny; the question of antitrust injury in these cases will often be 
determined only when the underlying question of violation is resolved. 
As a result, the antitrust injury requirement is not likely to curb the 
type of suits most likely to be filed against competitors to restrain com-
petition: those based on allegations that what is in reality aggressive 
and effective competition is a form of predatory or exclusionary 
conduct. 
From an overall public policy perspective, one can argue that the 
issue of whether private plaintiffs should be allowed to proceed with 
claims against their rivals should be resolved in such a way that ac-
counts for the potential harms to competition caused by such claims. 
If this unconditional approach were used, the initial scrutiny would 
consider not only whether the alleged claim, if true, could harm the 
plaintiff, but also what the probability is that the defendant behavior is 
efficiency enhancing and that the plaintiff's motive is to reduce compe-
159. In Tasty Baking Co. v. Ralston Purina, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 1250, 1275 (E.D. Pa. 1987), 
the court found only that the merged entity could engage in predatory pricing, that entry barriers 
were high, and that therefore predatory pricing was "feasible." Coupled with findings that the 
acquired firm had a "specific intent to monopolize," these findings were thought sufficient to 
establish likely antitrust injury. 653 F. Supp. at 1272-76. For a discussion of the proximity issue, 
see AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 141, ~ 340.2f. 
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titian. But in fact, the injury requirement provides no basis for mak-
ing efficiency versus consumer harm tradeoffs independent of the 
determination of violation. 
Remaining questions concerning competitor claims include 
whether the courts can employ other devices to eliminate cases aimed 
at limiting competition without full trial, and, more generally, whether 
the courts can distinguish between good and bad claims. The most 
obvious control device once the case reaches the merits is the motion 
for summary judgment. The ability to resolve cases on such motions 
depends, in turn, on whether the courts develop rational elements of 
violation that a plaintiff must prove before its case is allowed to pro-
ceed further. For example, if a violation cannot be found without 
proof that the defendant has at least a thirty percent market share, 
claims failing this test could be disposed of summarily. The use of 
such a market share or market power screen, often combined with a 
so-called "quick look," is becoming common in a variety of antitrust 
cases. 160 
But as competitor plaintiffs seek to work their way around the an-
titrust injury requirement, they are also likely to seize upon evolving 
theories of nonprice predation based upon proof of conduct that raises 
rivals' costs. The rationale of the Monfort case suggests that such alle-
gations, if proved, may well establish antitrust injury. Control of these 
actions through summary judgment could prove difficult given the 
generality of the economics literature on exclusionary practices. 
Moreover, as we discuss next, even when such firms employ exclusion-
ary devices and the injury to rivals is clear cut, the economics litera-
ture on exclusion of rivals indicates that consumers' welfare may be 
enhanced rather than harmed. 
B. Problems in Applying Theories of Anticompetitive Exclusion 
During the recent decades, scholars have developed frameworks 
that, if applied with care, stand to guide the courts in evaluating busi-
ness practices. The various rules for identifying classical predatory 
pricing are a case on point. 161 Unfortunately, the literature on the 
160. See, e.g., Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 
U.S. 284 (1985); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984); Reazin v. Blue 
Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., 899 F.2d 951, 966-72 (10th Cir. 1990); Valley Liquors, Inc. v. 
Renfield Importers, Ltd., 822 F.2d 656, 666 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 977 (1987); Rothery 
Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 217 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied. 479 
U.S. 1033 (1987). For a general discussion, see Thomas E. Kauper, The Sullivan Approach to 
Horizontal Restraints, 75 CAL. L. REV. 893, 905-08 (1987). 
161. See, e.g., Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices 
Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1975). 
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anticompetitive effects of vertical integration and exclusive contractual 
arrangements offers little guidance beyond corroborating the value of 
standard antitrust analysis in screening cases. The courts will need 
further direction to evaluate claims that meet what we referred to ear-
lier as the necessary core conditions for raising rivals' costs tactics and 
other exclusionary practices to succeed. 
The unique problem that the courts face with claims of anticompe-
titive exclusion is as follows: the necessary conditions that permit ex-
clusion of rivals by vertical integration or exclusive supply contracts or 
other means also embody efficiency advantages to the integration. As 
a result, the claimed adverse strategic effects will be nested in scenarios 
where efficiency benefits also will be realized. Stated in other terms, 
meeting the necessary conditions for anticompetitive exclusion is likely 
to ensure that some efficiency benefits are realized from the business 
practices in question. In general, when a firm realizes efficiency bene-
fits, it will be able to increase output, and a portion of the gain typi-
cally comes at the expense of rivals. This pattern of effects is, of 
course, fundamentally the same as what is expected from efforts to 
raise rivals' costs. 
The primary source of the efficiency benefits from vertical integra-
tion and variations thereof is that the integrated firm will make more 
efficient use of inputs. Of particular relevance here, it is generally ac-
cepted that when firms encounter deviations from competitive market 
conditions either upstream or downstream, vertical integration en-
hances efficiency. To be specific, most antitrust economists would 
agree with the following propositions: 
1. Under quite common input supply conditions, downstream 
manufacturers will purchase and use less than the optimal number of 
inputs. Consider the case where competitive input suppliers offer a 
rising supply curve - meaning that additional inputs will be supplied 
only if higher prices are offered. If a few (unintegrated) firms domi-
nate the downstream industry, they will tend to limit their purchases 
of inputs to keep the price low.162 This so-called monopsony or oli-
gopsony problem arises because purchases of additional inputs raise 
their price. Under competition, the higher prices apply to all transac-
tions, with the result that the cost of the extra input, from the down-
stream firm's point of view, includes both the price paid for it and the 
increase in price for other ("inframarginal") inputs. In contrast, an 
integrated firm will base output decisions on the true incremental costs 
162. This is a standard result in economics. For a discussion of its implications, see John S. 
McGee & Lowell R. Basset, Vertical Integration Revisited, 19 J.L. & EcoN. 17 (1976). 
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of inputs, which does not include the second component identified 
above. Vertical integration will, therefore, lead to greater use of the 
input, higher output of the final product, and improved consumer 
welfare. 163 
2. When both the upstream and downstream levels deviate from 
competitive pricing, vertical integration will eliminate the so-called 
"double-markup problem" and improve efficiency.164 With noncom-
petitive pricing by unintegrated firms at both levels, the final product 
price includes two markups. The first is from the noncompetitive pric-
ing by input suppliers; the second from downstream firms. The double 
markup problem - also known as double marginalism - refers to the 
fact that the two markups together exceed the level that maximizes the 
overall profits. Simply put, the final price is too high. In contrast, a 
vertically integrated firm will choose the single markup that maxi-
mizes profits, resulting in a lower final product price and improved 
consumer welfare. 
3. When input suppliers exercise a degree of market power and 
charge an above-competitive price, vertical integration will tend to im-
prove efficiency and enhance consumer welfare. The high input price 
has two adverse effects when firms are not vertically integrated: the 
downstream firms will underutilize the input and reduce output. The 
substitution to other inputs is cost-minimizing for the downstream 
firm, but is inefficient when compared to the input mix firms would 
choose if input prices reflected their true costs. The only exception is 
fixed-proportion technology, in which case there is no technical ineffi-
ciency.165 With vertical integration, the firm can set transfer prices of 
the inputs that reflect their true costs. This will correct the technical 
inefficiency and encourage more output. 166 
The import of these propositions is not that efficiency defenses 
163. The rate at which downstream firms will pass on the lower marginal costs of inputs to 
final consumers depends on the character of the demand curve. But the rate cannot be negative 
and under common conditions, such as linear demand, the downstream firm will decrease price 
by more than the reduction in input costs. This general effect occurs because firms with market 
power choose a price and output combination in the elastic part of their demand. Price reduc-
tions will, as a result, generate relatively large increases in quantity demanded. 
164. See Joseph J. Spengler, Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy, 58 J. POL. ECON. 347 
(1950). 
165. Given inventory costs and waste of inputs, a characterization of technology as using 
fixed proportions is only accurate to a degree. The practical issue is the extent to which propor-
tions are variable. When the elasticity of substitution among inputs is extremely low, the charac-
terization is appropriate. It is worth noting, however, that when it is appropriate, the derived 
demand for the input tends to be inelastic, making downstream firms vulnerable to the exercise of 
market power. 
166. See John M. Vernon & Daniel A. Graham, Profitability of Monopolization by Vertical 
Integration, 79 J. PoL. EcoN. 924, 925 (1971). 
December 1991] The Competitor Plaintiff 591 
should be entertained in some vertical integration and exclusionary 
practices cases. 167 Rather, credible efficiency defenses will exist when-
ever a strategic claim can be made. In addition, no economically 
meaningful tests distinguish ex ante the strategic and efficiency mo-
tives. Latent or exercised market power at one or both stages, variable 
proportions technology, and other market conditions specified in the 
recent theories of exclusionary practices, indicate the potential for effi-
ciency gains as well as the potential for strategic behavior.168 
At this point it is instructive to return to Julius Nasso Concrete 
Corp. v. DIC Concrete Corp., 169 which we discussed in Part II. We 
argued that this case matched one of the raising rivals' costs scenarios 
quite well and met the necessary conditions for anticompetitive exclu-
sion: two suppliers accounted for a substantial proportion of ready-
mix concrete and other building supplies sold to New York area sub-
contractors, including plaintiff Nasso and defendant DIC. Nasso 
complained that a 1973 joint venture agreement between DIC and one 
of the input suppliers resulted in higher input prices to Nasso and 
thereby excluded Nasso from competing effectively for large construc-
tion subcontracts. The economic principles identified here suggest, 
however, that ifthe two ready-mix suppliers were not offering compet-
itive prices, DIC had an efficiency motive for integrating with the 
ready-mix concrete supplier, namely to secure purchase rights 
whereby the marginal input costs would better reflect their true cost. 
Realizing those efficiencies would allow DIC to purchase more inputs 
and expand output. Such effects of course would support rival Nasso's 
claim of exclusion, but they are also the signs of improved 
competitiveness. 
In light of these comments, it is not surprising that economic anal-
yses of the effects of contractual integration and vertical mergers 
where a strategic advantage is conferred often find that consumer wel-
fare increases as a result.17° Particularly useful is the analysis by Ay-
res, 171 who models the foreclosure of rivals in one of the settings 
Krattenmaker and Salop discuss. Consistent with the first proposition 
cited above, oligopolistic manufacturers face a competitive input mar-
167. See Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 47, at 250. 
168. Factors such as specialized investments, substantial time intervals required for some 
transactions, economies of scale, and information externalities often lead to deviations from the 
idealized competitive market. 
169. 467 F. Supp. 1016 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). 
170. On a related point, Whinston, supra note 45, at 855-56, finds that the welfare effects of 
tying are ambiguous (even in a duopoly setting where, by assumption, there are no efficiency 
advantages). 
171. See AYRES, supra note 45, at 5-17. 
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ket with a rising supply curve. One of two manufacturers acquires 
half of the industry capacity at the input level. After the merger, this 
manufacturer "forecloses" its competitors by (1) producing more in-
puts, and (2) buying some inputs on the external input market. By 
overbuying inputs, the integrated firm raises the marginal factor cost 
to the rival, who then reduces input purchases and its downstream 
production. 
The harm to the rival manufacturer does not, however, lead to 
consumer injury. The rival reduces output, but the integrated firm 
increases production for two reasons. First, the motive to foreclose 
encourages overbuying of inputs, which increases downstream prod-
uct. Second, the conditions that permit the foreclosure (a noncompeti-
tive product market and a rising input supply) establish an efficiency 
benefit from the merger - that is, elimination of part of the monop-
sony effect, which in turn increases the integrated firm's output. 172 
Ayres shows that the vertical merger benefits customers even though it 
forecloses the rival in the sense of reducing its output.173 Interest-
ingly, Ayres also demonstrates that an ability to precommit either to a 
level of internal input production or to a level of external market 
purchases strengthens the integrated firm's incentive to overbuy on the 
external input market. Even though the precommitment will increase 
the extent of foreclosure, output prices fall by a greater amount and 
consumer welfare is further enhanced. 
In another analysis, Salinger174 addresses the effects of vertical 
mergers when both stages are oligopsonistic.175 He focuses on the 
tradeoff between (1) elimination of the double markup problem de-
scribed in the second proposition, and (2) the loss of an independent 
input supplier. This model, like many economic models of oligopoly, 
relies on the assumption of Cournot behavior,176 whereby each firm 
takes the other's output as given when choosing its own output. It 
follows from this assumption that the reduction in the number of in-
dependent suppliers leads to higher input prices and leaves 
nonintegrated suppliers at a competitive disadvantage. The elimina-
172. Consistent with the first proposition above, a buyer with market power will limit inputs 
when faced with a rising supply curve because marginal input costs exceed average input costs. 
173. The merger does, however, cause a technical inefficiency in that the input capacity 
owned by the integrated firm is used more extensively than the capacity owned by independent 
producers. 
174. See Salinger, supra note 45. 
175. See the second proposition above. 
176. In a Cournot equilibrium, total industry output equals N/(N + 1) times the competitive 
output, where N is the number of firms. Thus, industry output increases with the number of 
firms. 
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tion of the double markup problem, however, may offset this effect, as 
the integrated firm produces more of the final good. As Salinger 
shows, the final good price may rise or fall. 177 Nevertheless, Salinger 
argues that "the primary concern about vertical mergers . . . is their 
effect on the ability of remaining unintegrated firms to obtain neces-
sary inputs."178 We disagree, for the same reason that we would not 
condemn a manufacturer who, after gaining a technological advan-
tage, increases its output, but in doing so uses more inputs and causes 
input prices to rise. 
Hart and Tirole have recently offered a more comprehensive model 
of vertical foreclosure in which they assume that unintegrated firms 
can "choose from a full set of arrangements both when they are inte-
grated and when they are not .... " 179 They cite, for example, the 
possible use of two-part tariffs whereby the downstream firm may pay 
a fixed fee and a per unit price for each input it buys. They view the 
elimination of restrictions on the contracts nonintegrated firms may 
select as a virtue of their analysis. But this approach assumes away 
basic efficiency motives for integration, including (1) reducing transac-
tion costs, (2) eliminating technical inefficiencies in the use of inputs 
by downstream firms, and (3) as they note, eliminating double 
marginalization.180 A substantial literature on vertical integration has 
emphasized such considerations in decisions to integrate either fully or 
partially through contractual mechanisms.181 
Dennis Carlton in commenting on the relevance of Hart and 
Tirole's analysis to antitrust policy, makes the same point we have 
made above: 
[I]f the relevance of their results for policymaking is to be considered, 
these standard reasons [for vertical integration] must be taken into ac-
count because two-part tariffs may not be in use, and price may exceed 
marginal cost. Any time an input supplier is charging a downstream 
firm a price different from marginal cost, there are incentives for vertical 
integration . . . . Hart and Tirole suggest that policymakers should be 
especially alert to anticompetitive foreclosure when vertical integration 
occurs and one of the firms is especially efficient. But this is precisely the 
situation in which efficiency gains are greatest because price exceeds 
177. Salinger, supra note 45, at 352. 
178. Id. at 355. 
179. See Hart & Tirole, supra note 45, at 206 (footnote omitted). 
180. Id. at 206 n.2, 220 n.18. 
181. For a discussion that relates these considerations to antitrust analysis, see Oliver E. 
Williamson, The Economics of Antitrust: Transaction Cost Considerations, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 
1439 (1974). 
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marginal cost and there are variable proportions or a double markup.182 
Thus, the courts face the problem that, even when it is known that 
vertical integration has harmed an unintegrated rival, the effects on 
consumer welfare are ambiguous. One cannot discern from the mod-
els whether reductions in output by the foreclosed firms exceed the 
increase in output by integrated firms. 
Of the formal models of vertical foreclosure with which we are 
familiar, only Ordover, Saloner, and Salop183 find that vertical integra-
tion unambiguously leads to higher prices to consumers.184 The 
means by which they reach this conclusion are instructive, however. 
Only in the extreme circumstances they posit can we expect vertical 
integration to produce purely strategic effects that ultimately harm 
consumers. In their analysis, prior to the integration, two input sup-
pliers sell inputs to two downstream manufacturers. By assumption, 
the two suppliers are "Bertrand" -type competitors, meaning that de-
spite the duopoly, they compete such that price is driven to cost. As 
with the Hart and Tirole model, the authors state "that the double 
marginalization does not arise when the firms initially are 
unintegrated."185 In this context, a vertical merger between a pair of 
firms changes the input market from perfectly competitive (whereby 
input purchases are efficient) to monopoly (which causes suboptimal 
purchases of inputs). 
The conclusion Ordover, Saloner, and Salop reach - that the 
merger yields no efficiency gains - is obtained by assuming that hav-
ing two independent input firms yields a competitive result (the Ber-
trand assumption). Given that assumption, the adverse strategic 
effects only occur for the case in which there are two input suppliers 
initially. Alternatively, if there were three input suppliers, then aver-
tical merger involving one of them would not foreclose the 
unintegrated firms because - holding to their assumption - an input 
market with two suppliers would remain competitive. 
Ordover, Saloner, and Salop's assumption that two suppliers en-
sures competition but one implies monopoly is critical in another re-
spect. If, in the two supplier case, the two are not Bertrand-type 
competitors and instead charge prices that exceed their incremental 
182. Dennis W. Carlton, Comments and Discussion.in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC 
ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS 1990, 277, 279-80 (1990). 
183. See Ordover et al., supra note 45. Note also that Whinston models foreclosure due to 
tying and identifies a case in which overall consumer surplus is reduced even though some con-
sumers are better off. See Whinston, supra note 45, at 845-46. 
184. Hart & Tirole find that consumer welfare either is left unchanged by vertical foreclosure 
or is reduced. See Hart & Tirole, supra note 45, at 239, 246-47. 
185. Ordover et al., supra note 45, at 129. 
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costs, then a vertical merger would effect efficiency gains. The same 
holds true in the monopoly-input market/variable proportions case 
described in the third proposition above. Westfield, for example, dem-
onstrates that vertical integration yields gains in production efficiency 
except in the limiting case of fixed-proportions technology. 186 Again, 
while the theories of exclusionary behavior demonstrate that vertical 
mergers could produce strategic effects, they are not sufficiently de-
tailed to identify conditions when these effects will dominate the effi-
ciency effects that are expected to occur as well. 
From this discussion of fundamental economic principles, we con-
clude that even if one posits a strategic objective, one must then inves-
tigate whether vertical integration on net harms consumers. If there is 
no harm to consumers, the question follows whether the integration 
constitutes an antitrust violation. If the harm to unintegrated firms 
does establish a violation, then where does one draw boundaries to 
identify which types of competitor injuries constitute antitrust injury? 
The fundamental issue for antitrust policy in this setting is whether 
exclusionary practices lead to more or less output in the downstream 
market. From this perspective, it is somewhat remarkable that the 
models designed to reveal that vertical integration and exclusive con-
tracts may harm rivals fail to demonstrate that harm to consumers will 
follow. 
Our discussion also indicates that the usual approach to drawing 
boundaries between efficient and strategic behavior is not appropriate 
for vertical mergers and contractual integration aimed at foreclosing 
competitors. To repeat, even when one is certain that a firm intended 
to harm a rival and finds evidence of effect (that is, the integrated 
firm's profits increase and the rival's declines), the practices may en-
hance consumer welfare. Some scholars might nevertheless favor a 
search for policies to restrain exclusionary practices, arguing that 
judgments can be made about whether consumers are better or worse 
off from the combination of effects. This approach, however, requires 
both the identification of strategic behavior and the development of 
tools that will indicate the overall efficiency effects. Any serious effort 
to distinguish strategic and efficiency motivated integration would be 
daunting insofar as it would require knowledge at many levels of detail 
concerning the potential efficiencies gained, for example, from adjust-
ments to changing economic conditions. The information require-
ments for evaluation ex ante of the integration on consumer welfare 
are particularly severe given that in each of the three contexts identi-
186. Fred M. Westfield, Vertical Integration: Does Product Price Rise or Fall?, 71 AM. EcoN. 
REV. 334, 336 (1981). 
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fied above, the general case is ambiguous. Even ex post, the rather 
simple task of determining why a final product price rose or fell is not 
one of the economics profession's strengths. 
It is therefore altogether appropriate to worry that competitor 
plaintiffs will misuse rules designed to deter exclusionary practices. In 
fairness, those who have developed the theories of exclusionary prac-
tices are aware of these difficulties. Ordover and Saloner state that 
some definitions of anticompetitive behavior are likely to "condemn as 
illegal actions those that (a) elevate consumers' welfare, and (b) are 
part of innocent competitive interactions."187 Salop and Scheffman 
find that firms who rely on the strategic devices may increase their 
output. 188 For these reasons, forcing the courts to analyze competitor 
claims of exclusion on the merits is likely to blur rather than define the 
distinction between exclusionary practices and the natural conse-
quences of competition. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Breit and Elzinga recommended a decade and a half ago that the 
private antitrust remedy be abolished. 189 The extent of the misuse of 
antitrust laws in the cases we reviewed and the prospect for future 
misuse based on claims of predatory and exclusionary conduct offer 
support for this view insofar as competitor cases are concerned. Basi-
cally, within the category of competitor cases alleging horizontal re-
straints we find too few potentially good cases to justify the large 
majority that appear to lack merit. 190 Our primary concern is that 
processing claims involving anticompetitive exclusion on a case-by-
case basis is likely to be costly and impair economic efficiency given 
the fundamental difficulties in assessing whether defendants are (1) ex-
ploiting existing (or latent) market conditions with the objective of 
foreclosing rivals, or (2) taking actions to mitigate inefficiencies that 
derive (or may derive) from the same market conditions. 
187. Janusz A. Ordover & Garth Saloner, Predation, Monopolization, and Antitrust, in 1 
HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 537, 544 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Wil-
lig eds., 1989). 
188. See Steven C. Salop & David T. Schetfman, Raising Rivals' Costs, 73 AM. EcoN. REV., 
May 1983, at 267, 270 (Papers and Proceedings); Steven C. Salop & David T. Scheffman, Cost· 
Raising Strategies, 36 J. INDUS. EcON. 19, 27-32 (1987). 
189. William Breit & Kenneth G. Elzinga, Antitrust Enforcement and Economic Efficiency: 
The Uneasy Case for Treble Damages, 17 J.L. & EcoN. 329, 355 (1974). 
190. We note that while the competitor claims in our sample - those alleging "horizontal 
restraints" - constituted only about four percent of the overall population of claims, competi· 
tors filed about one out of every four claims. Given the nature of the allegations we reviewed, we 
doubt that the broader set of competitor claims (with the possible exception of those concerning 
tie-ins) is substantively different. 
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Yet even if there were agreement that the fundamental goal of anti-
trust policy was to promote economic efficiency, eliminating all private 
enforcement, as Breit and Elzinga suggested, would pose problems. 
First, this would require additional budget resources for federal anti-
trust agencies. Second and more significant, abolishing the remedy 
would prevent private parties from filing follow-on cases to recover 
damages from violations prosecuted by the federal authorities. Aside 
from concerns regarding compensation, this would reduce the incen-
tive of injured parties to provide information to the federal authorities 
regarding possible violations and to participate in the proceedings, 
which in tum would reduce deterrence. 
A less drastic policy prescription than Breit and Elzinga's, yet one 
that addresses the specific problem identified here, is to abolish the 
private antitrust remedy for competitor plaintiffs, but broaden the au-
thority of the federal antitrust agencies to collect judgments on their 
behalf in the event an antitrust violation harms competitors. Such 
judgments would be determined according to existing principles defin-
ing damages and they could be transferred to those parties claiming 
damages. 191 Retention of a federal remedy is motivated in part by the 
recognition that the set of cases reviewed here did not cover the full 
range of competitor claims. Notable exceptions include claims arising 
due to illegal tying and denial of access to essential facilities. 192 
The merit of the paren patriae approach for alleged competitor in-
juries ultimately rests on the issue of which institutions should enforce 
the antitrust laws. Even if the courts choose optimal rules within the 
given structure of remedies, they cannot achieve what might be a pre-
ferred optimum brought about legislatively that relies more on federal 
enforcers. The Clayton Act's broad language ("any person who shall 
be injured ... may sue"193) prevents the courts from implementing 
such a change. Also relevant to the choice are the political pressures 
that could undermine the policy change. While federal enforcers are 
presumably more oriented toward economic efficiency than many 
would-be competitor plaintiffs, the interests of competitors in re-
191. This would eliminate much of the moral hazard problem of paying interest on antitrust 
damages and also would offer a useful constraint on federal enforcement actions in that the 
federal authorities would seek to prove actual damages. One need for the rule against payment of 
interest on antitrust damages is that those who continue to be injured due to an antitrust viola· 
tion would have an incentive to delay their claims. See Pablo T. Spiller, Treble Damages and 
Optimal Suing Time, 9 RES. L. & EcoN. 45, 53-57 (1986). 
192. We recognize as well that the courts may be better able to evaluate these other types of 
competitor claims. If, for example, screens can eliminate claims that lack merit, then it might be 
appropriate to further temper our conclusion and maintain the private remedy for some types of 
competitor claims. 
193. Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15a (1988). 
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straining competition will not be eliminated. One advantage of the 
proposal to rely on federal enforcers to identify cases of competitor 
antitrust injury is that while interested parties will lobby for their in-
terests, the decision to file suit would be in the hands of federal enforc-
ers. Under the current regime, the decision to file claims is, of course, 
unilateral. 
More modest reform proposals include (1) reducing the multiplier 
for competitor plaintiffs from treble to single damages and (2) elimi-
nating the one-way fee shifting (in favor of successful plaintiffs) for 
competitor plruntiffs. 194 Alternative cost-allocation rules include the 
American rule, whereby each parties bears its own costs independent 
of the outcome, and the English rule, whereby the loser pays all fees 
up to a reasonable limit. In light of the evidence we have found -
that only a small percentage of competitor plaintiffs in our sample suc-
ceeded and the courts frequently dismissed their claims - the English 
rule might be an attractive means of limiting competitor misuse of the 
private antitrust remedy. 
In sum, we have found from the sample that competitor plaintiffs 
account for a substantial proportion of filed claims. In our view, 
neither antitrust injury requirements nor simple screens based on 
traditional antitrust analysis can control effectively misuse of the rem-
edy by competitors who claim exclusionary conduct. Some further 
modification and curtailment of the private antitrust remedy, as we 
suggest or as others may propose, will be necessary to do so. 
194. See Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15a (1988). 
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APPENDIX 
ORIGINS OF THE SAMPLE OF COMPETITOR CASES ALLEGING 
ILLEGAL HORIZONTAL RESTRAINTS 
599 
Table A lists the seventy-four cases in our sample, the date of their 
filing, and the district court that reviewed the claim. We identified this 
group of cases from the original Georgetown data set of 1935 cases by 
selecting all cases in which (1) the plaintiff's primary business relation-
ship to the defendant was that of a competitor, and (2) one of the 
primary allegations was "horizontal price-fixing and market allocation 
by horizontal competitors."195 Multidistrict litigation cases, some of 
which organized related private cases that followed important govern-
ment cases, are not included in the overall sample of 1935 case 
records. 
We eliminated from this set those cases dealing with patent licens-
ing on the grounds that the primary issue in such cases is how to bal-
ance gains from innovation with those from diffusion of technology, an 
issue dealt with extensively in the literature. In three cases within this 
group, plaintiffs appear to argue they need technical information to 
participate in the market: film for cameras, assemblies for attaching 
plastic tags to clothing, and telex terminal equipment. The detailed 
information we would need to evaluate these claims, e.g., the innova-
tion process, the degree of complementarity among the products, and 
the difficulty and delays in duplicating new technology, is not 
available. 
The Georgetown sample also includes fifteen cases filed by compet-
itors within the category of mergers, acquisitions, and joint ventures 
"among horizontal competitors." Based on references in the Wall 
Street Journal Index to announcements of mergers, SEC filings, and 
defensive suits by targets, seven of the fifteen cases filed by competitor 
plaintiffs to block mergers appear to have been filed by targets. The 
other eight cases raise issues similar to those in the competitor cases 
alleging horizontal restraints, but we do not analyze the merger cases 
here. Werden196 carefully analyzed six competitor plaintiff suits alleg-
ing Clayton Act section 7 violations and found that five claimed incipi-
ent predatory conduct. Two plaintiffs appear to have alleged reduced 
competition in some areas and increased competitive efforts targeted at 
rivals. 
195. Georgetown Project, Court Records Questionnaire, supra note 18, at 3, 5. 
196. Gregory J. Werden, Challenges to Horizontal Mergers by Competitors Under Section 7 of 
the Clayton Act, 24 AM. Bus. L.J. 213 (1986). 
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Table A. List of Competitor Cases Classified by Nature of Claim 
ANTICOMPETITIVE EXCLUSION CLAIMS 
Access to inputs 
Consolidated International Corp. v. Prefexray Division, Litton Medical 
Products, Inc., N.D. Ill., 6/12/73. 
Edlon Industries Inc. v. Slide-Rite Mfg. Corp., S.D.N.Y., 1/04/76. 
Julius Nasso Concrete Corp. v. DIC Concrete Corp., S.D.N.Y., 6/22/ 
78. 
International Filter Corp. v. Cambridge Filter Corp., N.D. Cal., 9/14/ 
82. 
Access to retail outlets or distribution network 
Budget Rent-a-Car Corp. v. Hertz Corp., Avis Rent-a-Car Inc., N.D. 
Cal., 4/29/77. 
The Big Cheese Inc. v. Kroger Food Stores, N.D. Cal., 8/29/80. 
J.W.T., Inc. v. Sichel, Inc., N.D. Ill., 5/09/73. 
Irwin Askenazy dba Ash Dist. v. The B. Manischewitz Co., N.D. Ill., 
12/23/77. 
Dairy Chain Inc, Westchester Processing Corp. v. Waldbaum's Inc., 
S.D.N.Y., 10/11/73. 
Charles Labs Inc. v. Leo Banner, S.D.N.Y., 10/07/74. 
Robert Simmons Inc. v. Binney & Smith Inc., S.D.N.Y., 9/26/75. 
Boardwalk Markets Inc., Busy Boy Markets Inc. v. Associated Food 
Stores, N.D. Cal., 2/20/76. 
The American Film Theatre Inc. v. Universal Film Exchanges Inc., 
S.D.N.Y., 1/06/75. 
Warehouse Wines & Spirits v. Safeway Inc., N.D. Cal., 12/24/81. 
Exclusive Contracts with Buyers 
M.K. Metals, Inc. v. National Steel Corp., N.D. Ill., 4/12/79. 
Poirot Exhibitors Service Corp. v. Chicago Automobile Trade Assoc., 
N.D. Ill., 2/22/78. 
Variety Theater & Dinner Club Inc. v. Carriage Trade Advertising 
Corp., N.D. Ga., 4/19/78. 
People of the State of Illinois v. University of Illinois, N.D. Ill., 6/18/73. 
Big Bear Cartage, Inc. v. Air Cargo, Inc., N.D. Ill., 7/11/75. 
C. W. Limousine, Inc. v. Albert A. Rothengast, Jr., N.D. Ill., 3/02/76. 
SRA-Triumvera v. B. Polisky & J. Agrest, N.D. Ill., 5/26/82. 
The Diners Club, Inc. v. Air Canada, Inc., S.D.N.Y., 12/27/78. 
Campbell Plaza Theatres Inc. v. Century Theaters, N.D. Cal., 11/04/75. 
Festival Enterprises Inc. v. R. L. Lippert, Sr., N.D. Cal., 3/15/76. 
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Big T Lines v. Navajo Freight Lines, N.D. Cal., 4/29/76. 
Abadir & Co. v. Industrias Quimicas de Mexico, N.D. Cal., 9/10/76. 
Oakland Tribune Inc. v. Chronicle Publishing Co., Inc., N.D. Cal., 12/ 
19/83. 
Price Predation 
Consolidated Terminal Systems Inc. v. ITT World Communications 
Inc., S.D.N.Y., 10/10/80. 
Canadian Ace Brewing Co. v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., N.D. Ill., 11/ 
13/78. 
Broadway Delivery Co. v. UPS Inc., S.D.N.Y., 3/14/75. 
Barnet's Express Inc. v. UPS of America, S.D.N.Y., 4/23/80. 
Thillens Inc. v. The Community Currency Exchange Assoc. of Illinois, 
N.D. Ill., 6/12/81. 
Shaw Concerts Inc. v. Columbia Artists Management Inc., S.D.N.Y., 8/ 
28/75. 
DiGiorgio Corp. v. Amstar Corp., N.D. Cal., 3/16/76. 
Trans-International Trading Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., N.D. Cal., 4/27/ 
77. 
Hoyt Heater Co. of Northern California v. American Appliance, N.D. 
Cal., 9/27/77. 
M & R Laboratories Inc. v. Trewax Co., N.D. Cal., 4/07 /78. 
CLASSICAL HORIZONTAL AGREEMENT 
Murphy Pacific Marine Salvage Co. v. Thomas B. Crowley, N.D. Cal., 
3/12/74. 
Cofinco Inc., Imperial Commodities Corp. v. Angola Coffee Co., 
S.D.N.Y., 11/26/74. 
Ace Agencies v. Seaboard Shipping Co., N.D. Ill., 3/12/81. 
GAF Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., S.D.N.Y., 1/30/73. 
VERTICAL PRICE FIXING, VERTICAL PRICE DISCRIMINATION 
Alloy International Co. v. Hoover-Nsk Bearings, Inc., N.D. Ill., 8/23/ 
73. 
Lee Klinger v. Chrysler Corporation, N.D. Ill., 1/15/73. 
Olympic Distributors, Inc., Sportmart, Inc. v. Leonard Steinlauf, N.D. 
Ill., 11/08/74. 
Vogt's Wine Shop v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., N.D. Ill., 1/06/82. 
Dyna-Cell Inc. v. Badische Inc., S.D.N.Y., 11/24/75. 
Arnie's Place Ltd. v. Jordache Enterprises Inc., R.H. Macy's Inc., 
S.D.N.Y., 11/26/79. 
A & W International Inc. v. E. W. Vierra, N.D. Cal., 3/23/77. 
Fred Lautze Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., N.D. Cal., 7/18/78. 
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Richard A. Harte v. International Diagnostic Technology Inc., N.D. 
Cal., 5/27 /81. 
BRANDNAME/PATENTINFRINGEMENT 
Grip-Pak, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., N.D. Ill., 7/26/77. 
Castcraft Industries, Inc. v. Headliners International Inc., N.D. Ill., 6/ 
23/76. 
National Business System v. A.M. International, Inc., N.D. Ill., 11/05/ 
81. 
Ben Clements & Son, Inc. v. Dennison Manufacturing Company, 
S.D.N.Y., 8/19/76. 
Premo Pharmaceutical Labs Inc. v. Boehringer lngelheim Ltd., 
S.D.N.Y., 1/21/81. 
Anti-Monopoly Inc. v. General Mills Inc., N.D. Cal., 8/11/75. 
Superior Products v. Thiokol Corp., N.D. Cal., 8/12/76. 
NO SHERMAN ACT ISSUE 
Martin-Trigona A.R. v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., S.D.N.Y., 6/ 
12/80. 
Mr. V's Enterprises Inc. v. Willegermand Inc., N.D. Ga., 5/22/81. 
McCall Sanders v. Tyson's Food, Inc., N.D. Ill., 2/20/73. 
Cargo Safe v. Bruest Industries, N.D. Ill., 5/24/74. 
Dan Goldenpaul Associates v. New York Times Inc., Associated Press 
Inc., S.D.N.Y., 1/05/73. 
Guido Sapienza (by his parents) v. New York News, Inc., S.D.N.Y., 10/ 
03/79. 
Dominick Berardinelli dba Bernard Assoc. v. Castle & Cooke Inc., N.D. 
Cal., 2/24/75. 
Alta Plaza Market v. Associated Food Stores, N.D. Cal., 1/16/78. 
International Travel Club of America, Inc. v. Karageorgis Lines Inc., 
N.D. Cal., 2/09/81. 
MISCELLANEOUS CLAIM OR INSUFFICIENT INFORMATION TO 
CLASSIFY CLAIM 
Coleco Industries Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., S.D.N.Y., 2/03/75. 
Depilatron Inc. v. Kree Inst. of Electrolysis Inc., S.D.N.Y., 11/10/75. 
Greater Kansas City Independent Taxi Assoc. Inc. v. Kansas City, W.D. 
Mo., 8/13/81. 
American Basketball Assoc. v. National Basketball Assoc., S.D.N.Y., 
12/09/75. 
Harold T. McCormick v. Bankamerica Corp., N.D. Cal., 1/31/74. 
Dacom Inc. v. Ricoh Co. Ltd., N.D. Cal., 1/30/76. 
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D. A. Richards v. American Veterinary Medical Assoc., N.D. Cal., 10/ 
31/79. 
J.M. Dungan, Trustee for ABC Touring Service of Salinas Inc. v. Mor-
gan Drive-Away Inc., N.D. Cal., 8/20/75. 
M.K. Metals, Inc. v. National Steel Corp., N.D. Ill., 4/12/79. 
